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THE NEED FOR TAKINGS LAW REFORM: A
VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES-A RESPONSE TO
TAKING STOCK OF THE TAKINGS DEBATE
Michael M. Berger* & Gideon Kanner**
In a recent issue of this journal, United States Assistant
Attorney General for the Environmental and Natural Resources Division ("ENRD"), Lois J. Schiffer, offered her
thoughts on regulatory takings litigation and voiced criticism
of pending federal legislation intended to rectify anomalies in
judge-made takings law that in its present condition fails to
provide adequate protection to owners of regulated property.!
Unfortunately, her presentation minimized the existing
problems and demonized the proposed solutions. This essay
provides a response.
But first, a word of disclosure.! While Ms. Schiffer is an
advocate for the federal government, these authors have
largely spent their legal careers representing property owners in litigation against government agencies, most of the
time in either direct or inverse condemnation actions, i.e.,
cases raising the very issues addressed by Ms. Schiffer-but
on the other side of the counsel table. Accordingly, this article first discusses the reality of litigation between property
* Shareholder, Berger & Norton, Santa Monica, California; Adjunct Professor in The Graduate Program in Real Property Development, University of
Miami School of Law; J.D., Washington University; L.L.M., University of
Southern California.
** Professor of Law Emeritus, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California.
Of Counsel, Berger & Norton, Santa Monica, California; J.D., University of
Southern California.
1. Lois J. Schiffer, Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 153 (1997). Ms. Schiffer is the attorney in charge of the Environment and
Natural Resources Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, the office that
defends the United States against claims by private citizens alleging that federal government actions have taken their private real property for public use
without compensation as proscribed by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See William 0. Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L.
REV. 227, 228-30 (1965) (stating that authors with "axes to grind" should so
note when they enter the scholarly lists, so their readers will know through
what spectacles their advisors view the problem).
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owners and the government, addresses some of the problems
facing land owners confronted with stringent government
regulations, and then comments on the legislative proposals
being advanced to rectify these problems.
Currently pending legislative solutions range from imposition of substantive criteria of regulatory inverse condemnation liability to procedural changes that would do no more
than ensure prompt availability of a neutral federal forum for
litigation of federal takings issues without duplicative proceedings before administrative agencies and state courts.'
Yet, government agencies and officials oppose them all-even
the latter-regardless of their shape, form, or substantive
content.4 Though all commentators concede that judge-made
substantive takings law is incoherent, and there is also widespread agreement that its ripeness aspects have become an
outright intellectual mess, government functionaries bitterly
resist any legislative reform. Their determined defense of
the present system's inefficiencies, anomalies, and injustices
offers powerful testimony that the status quo unduly favors
overreaching regulators, badly needs reexamination, and is
in need of legislative solution, even if overdue.
I. OVERZEALOUS REGULATORS HAVE AWAKENED LEGISLATIVE
INTEREST IN TAKINGS LAW

We can start with a point of agreement. In terms of the
number of properties involved, Ms. Schiffer is undoubtedly
correct in saying that most private property acquisitions by
the government occur either through voluntary purchase or
direct condemnation-which is as it should be.' At the time
3. H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. (1997).
4. See text accompanying notes 106-15.
5. No less is required by congressional enactment. Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1994). Still, the federal government
continues to take the position that its functionaries can simply seize private
property when it suits them, and say to the aggrieved owner "sue me." Stringer
v. United States, 471 F.2d 381, 384 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Herrero,
416 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1969).
Conversely, when it suits them, federal land acquisition officials have been
known to delay acquisition for years in a sometimes openly brazen effort to
wear the property owners down and to acquire their land for thirty cents on the
dollar as one Park Service functionary put it. United States v. 341.45 Acres,
751' F.2d 924, 927 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United
States, 459 F.2d 504 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
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of her publication, Ms. Schiffer reported that 4000 direct condemnation matters were pending in her office.6
But the sheer volume of outright acquisition cases reveals little, and has even less to do with inverse condemnation, the topic at hand. In the acquisition cases Ms. Schiffer
highlights, the takings are not and cannot be denied; those
are cases in which land is being overtly acquired for new a
federal building. or other public project, that would occupy
the subject property. In an effort to show the magnitude of
this body of work (and, presumably, demonstrate the lengths
to which the government goes in order to do the right thing),
Ms. Schiffer notes that the estimated compensation for these
cases is $360 million.7 While standing alone, this figure
seems large, it comes to an average of only $90,000 for each
of the 4000 properties on the government's wish list, a rather
modest amount these days when an average suburban house
in metropolitan areas of California sells for over a quarter
million dollars. These figures pale to insignificance when
compared to the kind of cases that have made "takings" a
household word. For example, after a dozen years of intense
litigation, the Whitney Benefits case8 finally settled when the
government paid $200 million for taking the coal mining
rights on one property in Wyoming. 9 Moreover, the current
Pacific Lumber litigation ° involves more than half-a-billion
dollars worth of redwoods.
Apart from these cases, there are also situations that
arise from local regulations in which the lives' savings of ordinary individuals can be wiped out by the stroke of a government regulatory pen. People like James Hernandez, a
blind and crippled music teacher who accepted the reality
that his quiet neighborhood was becoming commercialized
6. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 153-54.

7. Id. at 154.
8. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
9. Id. Only $60 million was awarded for the value of the taken property.
Id. at 1178. The remainder was for attorneys' fees and interest that accrued
while the government fought the case long and hard. Id. By itself, that raises a
question of governmental bona [ides. As described by the Court, the statute
made clear that the particular land owned by Whitney could not be minedperiod. Id. at 1177. Thus, the only legitimate government activity should have
been negotiating or litigating over the purchase price, not denying liability. For
a full discussion, see George W. Miller, The Odyssey of Whitney Benefits: What
a Long, Strange Trip It's Been, 1 REAL PROP. RTs. LITIG. REP. 11 (1995).
10. Pacific Lumber Co. v. United States, No. 96-257 L (Fed. Cl. filed 1996).
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and sought a rezoning that would permit commercial development, but who, after years of municipal foot-dragging and
litigation in both state and federal courts, wound up unable
to develop his land.11 Or, people like Paul Kollsman whose
engineering prowess perfected the bombsights that helped
win World War II, but who found himself stymied by the City
of Los Angeles (and the courts), unable to get his case decided
before he died. 2 Or people like wheel-chair-bound Bernadine
Suitum, whose almost decade-long battle to build a single,
one-family home on a lot near Lake Tahoe (a deathbed
promise to her late husband) is still wending its way through
the courts, after her recent "victory" in the U.S. Supreme
Court that graciously let her start her litigation all over
again at the age of eighty two." Even though these people's
losses may be individually modest in comparison with the
numbers involved in Whitney Benefits or Pacific Lumber,
their impact on the victims is as great or greater.
Ms. Schiffer's generalized discussion of the law applicable to the ENRD's caseload also demonstrates the sort of governmental attitude that property owners routinely face. For
example, she correctly notes that the Supreme Court "made
clear" in 1946 that low flights by military aircraft result in a
taking when they significantly interfere with underlying
property owners' use of their land. 14 However, the United
States government continues to fight property owners who
live near airports and seek the protection of the half-century
old Causby decision."6 The property owners eventually get
paid in these cases, but not without lengthy, contentious litigation over liability. 6 This is often counterproductive; with
accrued interest and attorneys' fees the ultimate cost to the
government is higher than what it likely would have been if
settled earlier. Such litigation should not be necessary.
11. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981); see

RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED

183-205 (1985) (detailing the controversy).
12. Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1984).
13. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S.Ct. 1639 (1997).
14. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 154; see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946); see also Michael M. Berger, Airport Noise in the 1980s: It's Time for Airport Operators to Acknowledge the Injury They Inflict on Neighbors, INST. ON
PLAN. ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 10.01-.05 (1987).

15. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
16. See, e.g., Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Brown
v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100 (Fed Cir. 1996).
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However, the government's record of defying clear statutory
policy and forcing owners to litigate" demonstrates part of
the need currently felt by many legislators to get the government to treat the rights of property owners with the seriousness they deserve.
8
Next we turn to the National Trails System Act" and its
"rails-to-trails" program for converting abandoned railroad
rights-of-way into recreational trails. Ms. Schiffer notes that
the ENRD is litigating several cases under that scheme because the government's actions in approving such a conver9
sion "might give rise" to takings claims. "Might?" That's a
bit of an understatement. Hornbook property law has it that
discontinuation of an easement terminates the dominant estate, and restores to the owner of the servient estate full unencumbered fee title." This means that if the government
wants to impose a new hiking path easement onto the former
railroad right-of-way, it must acquire the right to do so. The
Supreme Court dealt with this question in the 1990 Preseault
case, 2 by making clear that the only thing standing between
Mr. and Mrs. Preseault and recovery of compensation for a
taking of their property was proof of their ownership of the
22
underlying fee title under Vermont law. It is clear that the
"rails to trails" program was adopted for the specific purpose
of overriding state laws regarding extinguishment of railroad
easements, and making former railroad rights-of-way avail-

17. But see 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1994); in particular, see 42 U.S.C. § 4651(8)
("No Federal agency head shall intentionally make it necessary for an owner to
institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking of his real property.").
18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (1994).
19. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 157.
20. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 463-66

(1993).
21. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
22. Id. The Preseaults had challenged the validity of the statutory scheme
on the ground that it took their property but paid them nothing. Id. at 11-13.
The Supreme Court held the case to be unripe for determining the statute's validity, until the Preseaults sought compensation in the Federal Claims Court.
Id. at 17-19. The Supreme Court did, however, note that owners of fee simple
interests in land once covered by abandoned rights-of-way will have cases
where "rail-to-trail conversions will amount to takings." Id. at 16. The concurring opinion of Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy was even more emphatic
on this point. Id. at 23. All justices rejected the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that no rails-to-trails conversions could be takings,
as a matter of law. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 1725 (1990).
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able as hiking and biking trails.23 Since abandonment of the
easements for railroad usage would return full unencumbered ownership rights to the underlying fee owners under
state law (a rule followed everywhere in the country), the
federal scheme was intended to trump the state laws and,
pursuing the fiction that the railroads might some day need
to reactivate those lines for national defense, redefined the
concept of "abandonment of railroad use" to not include
tearing up the tracks and replacing the trains with joggers. 4
Preseaultwas one of those "rails-to-trails" cases that Ms.
Schiffer reports were still being litigated in 1997-seven
years after the Supreme Court provided some pretty clear
guidance as to the land owners' rights. But if you want an
insight into the "rails-to-trails" litigation reality, the subsequent history of the Preseault litigation is an object lesson.
In defending itself against Mr. and Mrs. Preseault's claim,
the government convinced a trial judge and a panel of Court
of Appeals judges that the statute of limitations for the Preseaults to have filed suit ran out in 1926, 25 somewhat before
they were born, let alone acquired title to the property, and
23. The first several attempts to compel right-of-way conversion to hiking
trails met with a decided lack of success. The state courts concluded that, once
the railroad abandoned its usage, it had no interest to transfer, and the unencumbered land became the property of the underlying fee owners. See, e.g.,
McKinley v. Waterloo R.R. Co., 368 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1985). State statutes attempting to compel such conversion were struck down. See, e.g., Lawson v.
State, 730 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1986) (a case where hikers went to Congress to get
federal legislation enacted to override state law).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1994); see also National Wildlife Federation v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 850 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see generally Michael
M. Berger, Rails-to-Trails Conversions: Has Congress Effected a Definitional
Taking?, INST. ON PLAN., ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN

§§ 8.01-.08

(1990).

25. The government prevailed in the trial court on the theory that the taking occurred in 1920 when Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, an
event that occurred two years before Justice Holmes first articulated the regulatory takings theory in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
at a time when nothing had yet been taken from the servient owners. All that
had happened in 1920 was that Congress had asserted authority to regulate
interstate railroads. See Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-28101
(1994). From that lone legislative act, the government extracted an asserted
perpetual immunity for anything in any way related to rail transit, since-went
the argument-the taking occurred upon enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act and the statute of limitations ran out in 1926. For the superseded
opinion of the court panel, see Preseault v. United States, Nos. 93-5067, 935068, 1995 WL 544703, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 1995). For more extensive
commentary, see Michael M. Berger, When to Make That Claim? Let's Go Back
in Time .... Los ANGELES DAILY J., Oct. 18, 1995, at 6.
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certainly before their servient estates were taken by the Rails
to Trails Act. Fortunately-for the sake of jurisprudence, to
say nothing of the Preseaults-the full court of appeals
granted rehearing en banc on its own motion26 and reversed
with specific directions to the trial court to reject any more
finely spun legalistic diversions and "to determine the just
compensation to which the property owners are entitled.""
An example of the attitudes facing those who want no
more than to be able to make economically productive use of
their own land comes in Ms. Schiffer's comment that "much
of the takings debate focuses on federal regulation that
merely restricts the use of property.... "28 "Merely?" Any
time a lawyer or a judge uses the words "mere" or "merely,"
get ready to duck.29 This word choice is a staple of government arguments that regulations stopping short of relieving
property owners of all of their rights cannot be takings of
property and, therefore, "mere" massive losses amounting to
most of the affected property's value may be inflicted on
property owners with impunity and without recompense.
The following examples illustrate the "mere restrictions"
property owners have been asked to accept, without compensation. In McKenzie v. City of White Hall,3° a city demanded
the donation of a portion of the owners' land as a condition to
cleaning up a city-caused nuisance. In Boise Cascade Corp. v.
Board of Forestry,3 the state demanded that a logging company leave fifty-six acres forever unused as a condition for
permission to log eight acres. In K & K Construction, Inc. v.
Department of Natural Resources,32 the state demanded that
twenty seven acres of wetlands in the middle of the property
be left unused as a condition to development permission for
the remaining twenty eight acres on the fringe. Because of
the configuration of the land, the trial court held that the
wetlands restrictions rendered the property "essentially
26. 66 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
27. Preseault v. U.S., 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
28. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 155 (emphasis added).
29. For one of the authors' acerbic views on judicial misuse of the belittling
adjective "mere," see Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is
Just Compensation?,48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 797 n.169 (1973).

30. 112 F.3d 313 (8th Cir. 1997).
31. 935 P.2d 411 (Or. 1997).
32. 551 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), leave to appeal granted, 562
N.W.2d 788 (Mich. 1997).
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worthless as commercial real estate."33 Finally, in Christopher Lakes Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County 4 the owner of forty

two acres of land was told to provide a stormwater drainage
system to serve the surrounding 300 acres owned by others,
before development would be permitted. "Mere" restrictions?
One of the problems is that government regulators often
feel that they are simply doing what is right for the community, and therefore the property owners should accept their
economic fate as "mere" restrictions. But takings litigation is
not usually a challenge to the propriety of government action.
Indeed, a takings claim presumes that the government is
acting within the scope of its authority-i.e., that the taking
is for a public use M-but, in the process, its actions have

taken private property without compensation.
What is not at issue is whether the Government can lawfully prevent a property owner from filling or otherwise
injuring or destroying vital wetlands ....

The question at issue here is, when the Government fulfills its obligation to preserve and protect the public interest, may the cost of obtaining that public benefit fall solely
upon the affected property owner, or is it to be shared by
the community at large.36
Thus, it is not necessary to explain that regulators are
good people who are trying to do the right thing. 7 In fact, the
"better" they are, the more necessary it may be to keep a legal eye on what they are doing.38 As the Supreme Court once
33. Id. at 416.
34. 35 F.3d 1269 (8th Cir. 1994).
35. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (recognizing that a
taking may also result from government regulations that do not advance a legitimate public purpose). Because of the courts' enormous deference to government action, such cases are extremely rare, but they do occur. See, eg.,
Richardson v. Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1165-1166 (9th Cir. 1997).
36. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
37. See, e.g., Schiffer, supra note 1, at 157-58. One is tempted to suggest,
however, that some federal authorities seem to have less understanding of
property owners' problems than others. See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, Between the
Flood and the Rainbow: Our Covenant to Protect the Whole of Creation, 2
ANIMAL L. 1 (1996) (bemoaning the fact that Congress might actually give credence to the interests of landowners when considering re-enactment of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994)).
38. In United States v. Certain Land in the Town of Truro, 476 F. Supp.
1031 (D. Mass. 1979), federal functionaries, eager to save public funds successfully pressured the town selectmen to amend local zoning bylaws to allow only
uneconomical, non-commercial large lots and then, decades later filed a con-
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stated:
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and of the Due Process Clause in particular that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern
for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more,
than mediocre ones."39
Still, government regulators, and their lawyers, believe

that they are doing The Lord's Work 40 by saving wetlands,
forests, and open space. They profess to be doing so not only
as an act of environmentalism, but also as an expression of
41
religious faith which they now want to drive public policy.

Often overlooked in this rhetoric is the fact that the forests
4
and the wetlands, as defined by government regulators belong to somebody who is made to pay taxes on them, and
then is de facto conscripted as an involuntary keeper of
"public property."

II. EXTREME REGULATIONS HAVE GIVEN RISE TO CUTTING
EDGE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Much of the clash between property owners and the federal government has come over environmental statutes and
demnation action claiming that the land should be valued at the thus depressed
values, in spite of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had much earlier forbidden valuation at prices that were depressed by a condemnor's pre-litigation
value-lowering activities. United States v. Virginia Elec. Co., 365 U.S. 624, 636
(1961).
39. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
40. This is not entirely facetious. Much of the preservationist rhetoric has
of late taken the slant that saving forests and endangered species is in the nature of doing religious good works. "[R]eligious values remain at the heart of
the Endangered Species Act." Babbitt, supra note 37, at 8; see also TOM
HAYDEN, THE LOST GOSPEL OF THE EARTH (1996).

41. See Gideon Kanner, 01' Time Religion Meets New Age, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
30, 1996, at A23.
42. The definition of "wetlands" used by regulators is at times straight out
of Orwell's fiction. See discussion infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
One of these authors once represented a Florida property owner who was
served by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with a cease and desist order, demanding that he cease "dredging and filling in waters of the United States."
Context Dev. Co. v. Alexander, No. 80-1708-Civ-JE (S.D. Fla. 1980). What was
that earth rapin' villain doing? He was plowing dry land to plant a citrus grove.
Id. The feds never got around to explaining how one can plow "waters of the
United States."
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regulations, like the ones designed to preserve wetlands and
endangered species. From the property owners' viewpoint,
the chief problem with efforts to preserve the planet for us all
is that regulators expect someone else to pay an inordinate
part of the price for preservation, rather than spreading the
cost over the entire benefited populace. In the process, the
government spokespeople and their allies tend to paint protesting property owners as malcontents who are concerned
only with their own economic interests; who would sacrifice
the health and safety of everyone to protect these interests.
The irony is supreme because members of the environmental movement that is the moving force behind such harsh
regulations, are overwhelmingly affluent upper and uppermiddle class persons who "have got theirs," 43 as the old expression goes, but expect would-be competing seekers of the
good life to lower their expectations and forego the enviable
amenities that the environmentalist leaders are already enjoying. As the late dean of the land-use bar, Richard Babcock, astutely observed: "it is a curious phenomenon that the
titans of industry who abhor government regulation and
place full-page ads in the Wall Street Journal extolling the
virtues of the marketplace are among the most zealous devotees of zoning."44 We should take at least a brief look at the
reality of these statutory schemes before proceeding further.
1.

The Metamorphosis of "Swamps" into 'Wetlands"

We used to call 'em swamps, bogs, marshes or fens. We
used to recognize that at least some of the critters that inhabited those oozing, slimy places were dangerous and the
sources or carriers of devastating human illnesses. The U.S.
Supreme Court at one time saw them as "the cause of malarial fevers," and opined that "the police power is never more
legitimately exercised than in removing such nuisances. " "

43. See BERNARD FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE
(1979); and WILLIAM TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA IN AN AGE
OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1983).
44. BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note 11, at 56.
45. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900); see JAMES V. DELONG,
PROPERTY MATTERS 124-25 (1997). For example, much of Florida land patented
by the federal government under the Swamp Land Act to private owners was

conveyed on condition that they would drain swamps. See Swamp Land Act, ch.
84, Stat. 519 (1850) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 982-984 (1994)). Today, any Floridian so foolhardy as to try it would be prosecuted.
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We used to drain or fill swamps, sometimes spending large
amounts of government money, in order to control disease,
open up waterfront land to recreational and other uses, and
provide suitable expansion space for a growing population.
Government entities were often at the forefront of these
swampbusting activities.4" Now "swamps" have metamorphosed into "wetlands." Where swamps were once bad, wetlands are now good-unless there's one on your property.
Much of the problem with this federal regulatory program is that its most hotly contested aspects were created
almost entirely of the whole cloth by regulators bent on an
Orwellian interpretation of a statute that does not even mention "wetlands."4 7 The problem is exacerbated by courts that
meekly go along with this vast expansion of congressional
language by government agencies. One result has been a
widespread perception that, though legal and harshly enforced, these regulations are overreaching and illegitimate.
The public image of wetlands, assiduously fostered by
environmentalists, is that of watery marshes covered with
sawgrass or cattails, dotted with mangrove thickets, the
home to aquatic birds, fish, and other assorted wildlife. In
fact, under the government's definition, a "wetland" can be a
lifeless, smelly pond, or a muddy depression in the earth, unconnected to any other water, and good only as a breeding
ground for mosquitoes. As far as the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is concerned, as long as it's wet, and
sometimes not even that, it's a "wetland."
4s
Section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act was originally enacted to rectify massive pollution problems, like the
one that led to Ohio's Cuyahoga River catching fire. That
river was so badly polluted with industrial wastes that it actually burned. This incident galvanized Congress into action.
The resulting statute, the Clean Water Act ("CWA") of 1972,
dealt with controlling the "discharge" of "pollutants" into
"waters of the United States," traditionally understood to be
navigable waters.49 Somehow without benefit of express Con46. Noted California examples are Marina Del Ray in Los Angeles and Mission Bay in San Diego, both of which were dredged and transformed by the respective counties, from "swamps" into modern recreational marinas, parks, hotels, restaurants and housing.
47. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
49. Id. Even that definition was rather expansive; navigable waters were
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gressional enactment, the CWA was reinterpreted by federal
regulators as the launching pad for a "wetlands" protection
crusade. But somewhere along the line, the wetlands regulation crusaders lost sight of the difference between saving
wetlands and worshipping them. °
The expansion began with the government administratively defining
"waters of the United States" to include
"wetlands."5' Though it strained credulity that Congress intended so revolutionary a change in the law without ever
mentioning it, even that usurpation would not have been as
controversial as it is, if the regulations had at least been restricted to land that is perceptibly wet. But in 1987, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, jointly charged with administration of
the clean water program, redefined "wetlands" as land that
may never even get wet, except when it rains. Under this
definition, if there is water under the land's surface, rising to
a point twelve inches below the surface for seven to seventeen consecutive days,5" the dry land is deemed wetlands.
This definitional sleight-of-hand created "wetlands" that are
invisible even on close inspection of the land. To cast the
definitional net so broadly as to expand federal regulatory
power over dry land, that does not implicate any legitimate
environmental or federal government concerns, is not an effort to save wetlands.
Thus, if you are buying what plainly appears to be ordinary dry land, in the eyes of this newly minted law, you may
nonetheless be buying unusable "wetlands." Of course, the
presence on the land of even a small pond may bring the full
weight of federal bureaucracy on you if you try to deal with it
as your own. This is high stakes poker. Consider the case of
once defined by a wag as including any streams with enough water in them to
float a United States Supreme Court opinion. United States v. Kaiser Aetna,
408 F. Supp. 42, 49 (D. Haw. 1976).
50. See DELONG, supra 45, at 149.

51. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1993); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(f) (1993).
52. The number of days depends on the local climate, because the rule re-

quires subsurface wetness during five percent of the growing season. Thus, the
maximum (for some parts of California and the sun belt) would be seventeen
days. Further north and east, that number of days declines. The Corps takes
the position that this means that the soil can be considered "saturated to the
surface" even if the surface is dry. See FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND
DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS (1987); and Letter from Col. R.O.

Buck to the Hon. Owen Pickett (Feb. 2, 1994) (on file with the authors and the
Santa ClaraLaw Review).
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an Illinois development called Victoria Crossings, developed
by Hoffman Homes, as an example.53 The owner knew that
on a 43-acre parcel, there was an 0.8-acre spot that consisted
of a slight depression in the land, with a clay lining that precluded normal drainage. A tiny portion of the tract was undeniably wet, but it was not connected to any other waters,
and was certainly not navigable; hardly a "water of the
United States." So Hoffman filled it to level out the land in
preparing for construction.55
Big trouble followed. For about a decade beginning in
1986, Hoffman Homes was either in administrative proceedings or litigation over its eight-tenths of an acre isolated
pond.56 The EPA thought the area was within its jurisdiction. 7 On what basis? Why, on the "reasonable bird" theory,
of course.58 Bear with us; this is not legal humor, this is serious-at least according to the EPA The EPA's argument was
that this isolated wet area was within its jurisdiction under
the interstate commerce clause and thus subject to federal
regulation.59 Interstate commerce? How? Well, said the
EPA an aquatic bird, migrating from one state to another,
might see this water spot and decide to pause for a rest, or a
drink. ° Would this mean that any migratory bird, just by
taking such a momentary pause, transforms an unregulated
private pond into a "water of the United States"? Of course
not, said the EPA-not just any ol' bird, only a "reasonable
bird."6 Now stop snickering, go read the court opinions and
see for yourself."
53. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992),
vacated, reh'g. granted, 975 F.2d 1554, 1555 (7th Cir. 1992), opinion on reh'g,
999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
54. Id. at 1311.
55. Id.
56. See generally id.
57. Id. at 1312.
58. Id. at 1320.
59. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, 961 F.2d 1310, 1319-20 (7th Cir.
1992).
60. Id. at 1320.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1320-21. The court rejected the "reasonable bird" theory, no
doubt to the dismay of members of the ornithological profession who were thus
deprived of lucrative future opportunities to testify as expert witnesses as to
whether a particular bird alighting on a farmer's pond was in fact 'reasonable"
or just a loon. The EPA's guidance letter on this subject became known as the
.glancing goose" letter. See DELONG, supra note 45, at 131-32. We leave it to
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Ms. Schiffer also takes pride in the speed with which the
regulators process permits pursuant to section 404 of the
Clean Water Act.63 However, this is a hotly disputed proposition. Extensive studies performed by specialized private
counsel, notably Virginia Albrecht of Washington, D.C.,
widely regarded as a renowned expert in the field, show the
contrary; on average, the permit application process takes
265 days if approved, 483 days if denied with prejudice, 133
days if denied without prejudice, and 390 days if applicants,
in exasperation, withdraw their application.64
This is not the place for an examination of all the legal
and administrative issues raised by wetlands protection
regulations and their enforcement by the EPA and the Corps
of Engineers. 5 It should suffice to note that, with regulators
relying on such absurd concepts as the invisible "wetland"
and the "reasonable bird" to sweep within their jurisdiction
all manner of properties, conflicts between property owners
and regulators will provide grist for years of litigation. The
stakes are simply too high and the government's position too
unreasonable for the land owners to acquiesce in such overreaching government demands. What makes the situation
worse, is that in addition to stultifying the right to develop
and use one's property, the potential penalties for guessing
wrong about the nature or existence of a wetland are staggering. A property owner can be fined up to $25,000 per day
and given a year in prison for the unintentional, but negligent, violation of the law.66 This is clearly an effort at in terthe readers to figure out exactly what that means.
63. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 155-56.
64. See Virginia S. Albrecht & Bernard N. Goode, All Is Not Well With Section 404, COURSE MATERIALS, ALI-ABA LAND USE INSTITUTE 377, 377-78 (Aug.
15-17, 1996). A concise description of the Albrecht-Goode study and its methodology may be found in DELONG, supra note 45, at 142-43. The readers will
have to make up their own mind as to whether Ms. Schiffer or Ms. Albrecht and
Mr. Goode present the more accurate picture. One cannot help concluding,
however, that if a section 404 permit were quickly and easily obtainable, all this

controversy about this facet of wetlands regulation would not exist.
65. We, cannot, however, fail to note that putting the Corps of Engineers in
joint charge of this program may have been a cosmic act of humor pulled off by
the United States Congress. The Corps of Engineers had for years been reviled
by environmentalists for raping and pillaging the land during its halcyon years

of dam building and river channelizing, and with some justification. Now it is
to protect the country's natural waterways from the depredations of others.
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1994). The government's enforcement practices can
get downright bizarre. Marinus Van Leuzen, a Dutch immigrant living in
Texas, was informed that he would need permits from six agencies to build a
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rorem governance that rightly runs against the grain of
American social and political values.
In defense of the EPA's criminal enforcement actions,
Ms. Schiffer disparages the "horror stories." 7 She points to
the saga of John Pozsgai and concludes that he "is no hero."68
He may indeed not be a "hero," but neither is he the villain
the government made him out to be. Guilty or not, his plight
causes legitimate concerns about governmental overreaching.
Ms. Schiffer's depiction of Mr. Pozsgai's stubborn resistance
to federal efforts to enforce "wetlands" laws, overlooks what
he actually did. Mr. Pozsgai cleaned up a junk pile filled
with discarded tires and other refuse whose illegal dumping
and accumulation blocked a little stream. The illegal dumping caused the stream to spread, thus creating a "federally
protected wetland," which, under the perverse reasoning of
the authorities, was now sacrosanct even though its maintenance would necessarily perpetuate an illegal trash dump on
Pozsgai's land-hardly an environmental triumph. Whatever
the moral of this story may be we leave to the readers' judgment.69 But in our book the EPA simply overreached, even on
its own premise. Even if he was guilty of a malum prohibitum, Mr. Pozsgai's case arose from a perverse misapplication
of the law absurdly requiring him to preserve a garbagestrewn eyesore. The problem-if that is what it was 7 -could
easily have been handled by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to file criminal charges. At most this was a matter for civil enforcement proceedings, using an injunction if
necessary. The fact that the EPA found it appropriate to
bring the full force of the criminal law to bear on this "small
potatoes" case based on these bizarre and morally highly ambiguous facts, does not speak very highly of the soundness of
its judgment. How many high-level executives of large comhouse next to his bait shop on a 0.4-acre admittedly wet parcel. Jonathan Tolman, A Sign of the Times, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1994, at A15. He evidently
thought this was crazy, so he built the house without a permit. For that he was
ordered to erect a 10 by 20 foot billboard with an apology, pay a $350 per month
fine for 12 years (for a total of $50,000), dig a 2-foot deep moat around his
house, create a new wetland at his expense, and remove his house altogether
after eight years. Id.; see also DE LONG, supra note 45, at 133.
67. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 162-64.

68. Id. at 163.
69. See United States v. Pozsgai, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990).

70. We have great difficulty in understanding how Pozsgai's elimination of
an obvious nuisance could be viewed as an environmental problem of all things.
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panies and how many municipal officials has the EPA put in
federal prison for massive pollution of rivers? Not many we
dare say."
Fortunately, the EPA's overly enthusiastic enforcement
of criminal penalties is finally being halted in some judicial
quarters. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently issued its opinion in the Wilson case,72 another prosecution for filling wetlands. This one involved a regulation
giving the federal government jurisdiction over wetland filling that merely "could affect" interstate commerce. 73 The
court found this to be unauthorized by the Clean Water Act,
and hence beyond the regulatory jurisdiction of administrative agencies to enact.74 A million dollar fine and a twentyone month prison sentence were set aside.7"
In the end, whatever the merits of preserving wetlands
may be, the current wetlands regulations are overreaching in
a way not intended by Congress. Furthermore, the government abuses these regulations by applying them to lands
that are simply not "wetlands" by any non-Orwellian English-language standards. Moreover, the penalties imposed on
citizens, including those acting without any criminal intent
or even unintentionally, are simply draconian and offensive.
This is particularly galling when they are contrasted with
daily newspaper and television news that regularly reports
stories of violent, convicted criminals who nonetheless receive
the proverbial "slap on the wrist," followed by probation or a
few months' incarceration-and even that often cut shorter
still for "time off," or because the local jail is overcrowded,
forcing early release of prisoners.
Altogether, however desirable the preservation of true

71. See Bryan Abas, Counterpoint: Dingell's Justice Probe Is Justified,
WALL ST. J., July 22, 1993, at A15 (charging that the Justice Department goes
easy on truly large-scale polluters).
It is difficult not to surmise that by bringing these high profile, extremely
harsh enforcement actions against "small potatoes" transgressors like Pozsgai
or Van Leuzen, the regulators are seeking to send an in terrorem message to
the population at large, and thus discourage opposition to its illegitimate practices by those most likely to oppose them. We suggest that such draconian government policies go far beyond proper deterrence.
72. United States v. Wilson, No. 96-4498, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35971, at
*1 (4th Cir. Mar. 3, 1997).
73. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1993).
74. Wilson, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35971, at *2, *13-*15.
75. Id. at *46.
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wetlands may be, the regulators have overreached, and they
plainly do not understand the difference between ends and
means. To address this problem, relief from Congress would
be appropriate.
2. ProtectingRats and Bugs at Human Expense
That brings us to Ms. Schiffer's spirited defense of the
harsh externalities imposed on land owners by endangered
species protection laws. She would do well to present the
government's position face to face to farmers or loggers in
support of the assertion that for the sake of the well-being of
a species of bird, rat, weed, or insect,76 they are to be stripped
of their livelihood, de facto conscripted as involuntary keepers of public animal preserves, and compelled to leave their
land fallow and unused (while also being required to continue
making mortgage payments and paying property taxes on it).
Indeed, there have been cases in which unfortunate landowners were also de facto ordered to feed the critters." Absent a morally defensible explanation, we suggest that Ms.
Schiffer's argument is no more than an assertion of naked
government power that Congress is surely entitled to temper
by enacting appropriate legislation rebalancing the competing interests of rats and humans.
The plain fact is that species have been becoming extinct
76. Though it is widely assumed by the populace and loudly asserted by
politicians and environmentalists that endangered species protection centers on
majestic creatures like the wolf, the grizzly bear or the bald eagle, the fact is
that-as one commentator aptly put it-most protected species are insects,
plants, and fungi. Of course,. striving to protect the dung beetle does not make
for nearly as good a public relations image as doing battle for the bald eagle
(which ironically, is no longer endangered). See DELONG, supra note 45, at 99.
We are admonished that even the humblest weed must be saved because it
may or may not prove to be the source of a healing drug, but one does not hear
much about preserving the obscure species of monkey that may or may not be a
carrier of the HIV virus.
77. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1114 (1989) (fining rancher for shooting a grizzly bear that was munching on
his sheep); Moermann v. State, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding no
taking where state transported a protected herd of tule elk to the vicinity of
Moermann's farm, and the elk proceeded to tear down his fences and eat his
crops while the law forced him to stand by helplessly).
As Justice White aptly observed in his dissenting opinion on denial of certiorari in Christy, under the reasoning of that case, cities could solve their welfare programs simply by enacting laws allowing the poor to enter grocery stores
and help themselves to free food and other goods with impunity. Christy v.
Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
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without human involvement for tens of thousands of years,
not counting the dinosaurs which departed this vale of tears
millions of years ago. The notion that legislation can stop
this biological process by government ukase is as foolish as
King Canute's command that the tide not advance on the
beach. There are no doubt species whose preservation by
human intervention is desirable for scientific, moral or even
aesthetic reasons. But that hardly leads to the conclusion
that every sport that somehow survived the evolutionary
struggle to the extent of carving out a precarious little niche
for itself-in the case of the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly, a
speck of land of a few hundred acres"-is entitled by law to
take precedence over substantial, constitutionally enshrined
human rights without any societal recompense. If the survival of each species is that important, then so should be the
fair distribution of the true cost of its survival.
Beyond that, on a moral and policy level, and after giving
due consideration to the worthiness of the preservation of
species on principle, one is entitled to question whether exalting the well-being of rats79 and bugs" over vital, constitutionally-protected interests of people is really such a onesidedly slam-dunk issue as environmentalist rhetoric asserts.
However important environmental legislation may be, one
should be sensitive to matters of degree and observe the distinction between ends and means. We do not enforce criminal laws by disregarding the rights of people who get in the
way of law enforcement, and the same holds true for people
who have not done anything wrong and who only seek government permission to put their land (on which they are being taxed considering its highest and best use)8 ' to reasonably
78. See infra note 80.
79. See Gideon Kanner, CaliforniaRat Killer Gets Off, WALL ST. J., May 24,
1995, at A15 (commenting on the arrest and abortive prosecution [and false accusations of unrelated wrongdoing] of a Chinese farmer in Kern County, California, for the "criminal offense" of plowing his land, and in the process running
over some Tipton kangaroo rats).
80. See Kim Kowsky, Protected Status for Fly Stirs Up Hornet's Nest, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1993, at A3, (reporting the government's demand that a hospital
site be moved [at the cost of millions] to protect the habitat of the Delhi Sands
flower-loving fly). See also National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
81. A chilling insight into the regulatory mentality is provided by Bergen
County Assocs. v. City of East Rutherford, 625 A.2d 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993), in which federal regulations reduced the assessed value of the subject property from $19,978,100 to $976,500. The local taxing authority none-
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productive uses. As Justice Brennan aptly put it: "After all,
if a policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a
planner?"82 Since planners refuse to respect constitutional
values83 and the courts go along with the gag, as it were, then
there is nothing wrong with Congress exercising its lawmaking prerogatives; stepping in to restore an economic and
ethical balance. That may heighten the responsibility of the
government, and make its job harder, but enforcing the outermost limits of the state police power is, and should be, easy
only in a police state.
3. Forcingthe NIMBY Problem
Last but hardly least, since Ms. Schiffer's essay was tendered for debate, it cannot go without emphatic notice that a
discussion of the takings problem in the limited context of
environmental laws, such as wetlands or endangered species
protection statutes, misses the principal point on which the
takings issue has in fact centered. Of the land-use/takings
cases considered by the Supreme Court in the past fifteen
yeas, most involved neither wetlands regulation nor endangered species protection, but rather housing. In at least six
cases considered by the Court between 1980 and 1997,84 the
plaintiff-landowners sought no more than government permission to devote their land to the lawful construction of
housing, only to be thwarted by local regulators on grounds
that in no way implicated wetlands or endangered species.
Given the strong, long standing federal' policy favoring
availability and affordability of housing, Ms. Schiffer's failure
to note this facet of the takings problem is unfortunate.
True, in her practice she does not have to face or defend the
misdeeds of local zoning authorities whose land-use decisions
theless insisted on taxing the owner at the higher [unregulated] assessment
level. Id. at 526. Though the courts eventually sided with the owner, id., one is
left to wonder about the mentality of government functionaries who would demand so unreasonable a right to tax, and carry their argument through two
court levels.
82. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.6
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. See infra note 115.
84. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S.Ct. 1659 (1997); Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825; Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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are at times no more than elaborate charades undertaken to
curry favor with their affluent suburban constituencies
striving to keep their posh communities intact. Just the
same, this facet of regulatory reality needs to be faced and
forthrightly discussed because here the familiar environmental slogans break down. The protection of the ambiance
of tony communities whose regulations precipitate so many of
these controversies is hardly the stuff of "environmental
preservation." Maintaining a high level of suburban amenities and fostering an environmentally desirable community
are two quite different things that are all too often antithetical to one another. Typical large-lot, upper crust suburban/exurban zoning, far from enhancing the environment is
environmentally counterproductive. It promotes sprawl, consumes agricultural land, requires a more widespread infrastructure and greater energy consumption. Moreover, it
lengthens commuting distances, adds to air pollution, and
prevents efficient use of mass transportation.
While one can readily understand how the image of
misty forests, serene wetlands, and endangered animals may
provide the regulators with superior "poster children" to be
displayed in public relations and litigational battles," the fact
is that most of the high-profile takings cases have been precipitated by more mundane NIMBY ("Not In My Back Yard")
interests doing their best to keep their suburbs exclusive and
exclusionary. To allude to the wisdom of the late Professor
Donald G. Hagman of UCLA, we must distinguish between
good planning and rent seeking by "environmental pretenders" who talk a good game, but actually strive to protect their
agreeable lifestyles from competing seekers of the good life,
by adamantly pursuing land-use policies that constrict
housing supplies and predictably, in the face of ongoing de85. See Richard J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency in the United States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179
(1997), for an insight into how it is done. Faced with the technical question of
whether an attempt by a single family lot owner to sell her transferable development rights in a nonexistent market was a mandatory prerequisite to
achieving ripeness for her taking lawsuit, Mr. Lazarus candidly explains how
his efforts in defending the government's position focused on singing the
praises of Lake Tahoe's purity and environmental value-worthy attributes, no
doubt, but clearly intended to shift the emphasis of the controversy away from
the violation of Ms. Suitum's constitutional rights, to contemplation of an environmentally attractive image. We see that as an effort to confuse ends with
means.
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mand, cause excessive escalation in home prices-a phenomenon all too apparent in California."
III. CRITICISM OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS LACKS
CANDOR AND EQUITY

That a debate should rage over legislative takings remedies is ironic. Early suggestions for legislative solution to the
"taking issue" were successfully disparaged on the grounds
that inasmuch as the problem was grounded in a constitutional provision, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
87
the solution would properly come from the courts. Alas, it is
now all too clear that the courts have not been equal to the
task. Their decisions have produced an incoherent, and at
times contradictory, body of law that concededly lacks standards by which to determine predictably whether a taking
has occurred. Unsurprisingly, efforts at a legislative solution
have reemerged.
Ms. Schiffer, however, considers the current legislative
88
proposals for reform "obviously flawed." Her position begins
on a reasonable note, but quickly segues into a categorically
partisan conclusion: "Of course, every citizen should be protected from unreasonable regulatory restrictions on property.
9
But compensation bills are exactly the wrong way to go."
Government functionaries always think that compensation is the wrong remedy for any harm inflicted by errant
government activity-no matter what the activity and no
matter how great or unjustified the harm to the damaged in86. As Judge Clark presciently observed in his dissent in Agins v. City of
Tiburon: "The environment which Tiburon seeks to preserve will disproportionately benefit that wealthy landowner, whose home will be surrounded by
open space, unobstructed view and unpolluted atmosphere." 598 P.2d 25, 35
(Cal. 1979) (Clark, J., dissenting).
Judge Stanley Mosk, of the California Supreme Court, also observed that,
"No one ever devised an ordinance to preserve an urban ghetto or crowded central city environment; it is always to protect the outer city, the suburb, the
middle or upper class housing development." Stanley Mosk, Finding a Direction for Our Environment, BARRISTER, Spring 1976, at 18.
87. For a concise summary of these proposals and how they fared, see Gus
Bauman, The Supreme Court,Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment:
Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS
L.J. 15, 53-58 (1983).
88. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 162.
89. Id. at 159. Significantly, Ms. Schiffer offers no suggestion as to how
citizens should be protected from unreasonable regulatory restrictions, and
says nothing about what by her lights would be the "way to go." Id. at 164.
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nocent citizens.9" Before the Supreme Court decided First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles91 a decade ago and concluded that the Fifth Amendment
mandated compensation as the constitutional remedy for all
governmental takings of private property, regardless of the
means used by the government to accomplish its task, all
government agencies (including the ENRD)92 loudly opposed
compensation as a remedy.93
Ms. Schiffer's argument in opposition to the currently
90. The paradigmatic instance of this phenomenon is the vicious and archaic rule that business losses are not compensable in eminent domain-a rule
of defective intellectual provenance See D. Michael Risinger, Direct Damages:
The Lost Key to ConstitutionalJust Compensation When Business PremisesAre
Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 483 (1985) (demonstrating that fact, and
also that in the entire twentieth century only one student note has favored this
rule, and while no other commentator or textwriter has, government lawyers
stubbornly continue advancing it, and most courts, alas, continue to apply it).
This problem descends to the level of a moral sewer in redevelopment
cases, where indigenous (usually small) business people are bulldozed aside
without compensation for their businesses, and their condemned land is then
turned over at subsidized prices to favored mass merchandisers, car dealers, or
owners of gambling casinos and shopping mall operators, who then go on to run
lucrative private businesses on it. See Regus v. City of Baldwin Park, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 196, 203-05 (Ct. App. 1977); Sonya Bekoff Molho & Gideon Kanner, Urban Renewal: Laissez-Faire for the Poor, Welfare for the Rich, 8 PAC. L.J. 627
(1977).
91. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 305 (1987). One of the authors was counsel for the church.
92. Intriguingly, although in First English the Solicitor General as amicus
curiae opposed the recognition of a constitutional right to compensation, believing that the "mandate [of the Fifth Amendment] is served by an equitable
remedy barring continued application of the offending regulations," Brief for
the United States at 6, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (No. 85-1199), in every case in which the
United States was a party, in which the issue of proper remedies for takings
came up, from Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932), to Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984), and Preseault v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990), and several cases in between, the federal government always took the position that "just compensation" is an aggrieved inverse
condemnee's sole remedy and that injunctive relief is not and should not be
available. This is quite consistent with general law or remedies. See Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
In spite of that history, in First English, the Solicitor General disparaged
monetary relief and argued in favor of injunctive relief, stressing that Congress
was always free to enact a compensatory remedy if it so chose. Brief for the
United States at 6, First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (No. 85-1199). Yet now, Ms. Schiffer tells us that compensation bills "are exactly the wrong way to go." Schiffer, supra note 1, at 159.
93. For a collection of the worst offenders, see Michael M. Berger, Happy
Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules for
Land-Use Planning,20 URB. LAW. 735, 739-42 (1988).
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pending legislation is that if enacted, it will paralyze enforcement of federal environmental laws, and that state laws
will not sufficiently protect the environment, or worker
safety, "and other values that give us the high quality of life
94
Americans have come to expect." This threatened impending decline in the American standard of living due to absence
of an adequate level of state regulations will come as shocking news to state and local regulators who have worked independently of federal intervention. It may even come as welcome news to occasionally beleaguered California business
people and property owners who are under the impression
that they are very much subject to all sorts of stringent and
burdensome state and local environmental and safety regulations.9"
We surmise that what really irks opponents of the
pending substantive legislation, is that payment of compensation is to come from funds already budgeted to the regulatory agency whose regulations or activities cause a compensable taking. The sponsors of this legislation evidently
believe it appropriate to fund the bill in this way because
they mean to force the regulators to come face-to-face with
94. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 161. Ms. Schiffer should not take it hard if we
remind her that the high quality of life enjoyed by Americans derives from our
free-market economy, rather than from enforcement of far-reaching government regulations, even if these can serve an important function if reasonably
applied.
95. See, e.g., Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049
(Cal. 1972) (imposing much stricter environmental standards on private development activities than those prevailing under federal law). Also, California has
exercised its prerogatives under the Clean Air Act, and the California Air Resources Board has accordingly established more stringent mobile source emissions standards than called for by federal law. See generally California Clean
Air Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 39000 to 44470 (West 1996 & Supp.
1998); Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 to 7671 (1994); LONGTIN'S
CALIFORNIA LAND USE § 5.12 (2d ed., 1997 Supp.) (describing the difference between state and federal laws). The CalOSHA folks are doing right well too with
regard to safety. So is the South Coast Air Quality Management District that
controls stationary emission sources, and the State Water Quality Control
Board that establishes water quality standards.
In short, even on her own premise, it is bureaucratic hubris for Ms. Schiffer
to suppose that the condition of state environmental laws is so enfeebled that
absent Uncle Sam's paternalistic intervention, a veritable environmental calamity will descend upon us and impair our quality of life. To the extent she
claims that takings legislation will in any way impact "safety of... workers"
or require "pay[ment] to manufacturers not to dump their waste into the
streams that run through our neighborhoods," she simply cannot be serious.
Schiffer, supra note 1, at 161; compare infra text accompanying notes 112-16.
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the economic consequences of their own regulatory decisions
and cause them to undertake serious cost-benefit analyses.
Under the proposed legislation, projected benefits of regulations with a significant impact on regulated individuals, will
need to be balanced against the true the cost of the program.96 Regulators do not have to do that now because these
costs are either not paid by the government-they are
dumped instead on those regulated (the usual case)-or they
come from a general judgment fund, not from the regulators'
own budgets.9 7
Thus, regulators and their admirers confronted with the
prospect of having to eat their own fugu8 are shocked.
Shocked! They figure that if the EPA, for example, has to reflect on having to pay for the predictable impact of another
"glancing goose letter," the zealousness of its regulations of
private property will be muted with disastrous sequelae, such
as-according to Ms. Schiffer-a decline in our standard of
living.99
96. This should not be a problem since such cost/benefit analysis to determine whether the regulatory game is worth the candle has been required for
the past decade by Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 C.F.R. 8859 (1988), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1994). One surmises that the bureaucrats' lack of enthusiasm for
complying with this order is a part of the present problem.
97. H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 6(f) (1996).
98. Japanese gourmets prize a species of blowfish called fugu whose gallbladder contains a lethal poison, and hence the fish must be carefully prepared
by highly skilled chefs. Dennis Ray Wheaton, Menus of the Rich and Famous,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, § 5, at 6. Accordingly, there is a Japanese custom
that requires a chef preparing fugu for a customer to taste his own creation
first.
The foremost candidate for poster child of the fugu principle in action is
former Senator and Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern who,
after growing frustrated by government regulations applied to a Connecticut
inn that he owned in the 1980s, was born again and opined that "I'm not sure
federal legislation is the way to go." Lives of the Party, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 2,
1996, at 28.
99. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. This argument qualifies
as an "oldie," but definitely not a "goodie." It was intoned in the past by judges
and government functionaries repeatedly, only to wind up in the end as a peek
into the clouded crystal ball, as The New Yorker magazine used to put it. Both
authors have written on the subject. See Michael M. Berger, The California
Supreme Court-A Shield Against Governmental Overreaching: Nestle v. City
of Santa Monica, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 199, 252-59 (1973); Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 765, 785-87 (1973); Gideon Kanner, When Is "Property"Not "PropertyItself': A CriticalExamination of the Bases of Denial of Compensationfor Loss of
Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W. L. REV. 57, 77-79 (1969). In spite of
the government foreshadowing of impending fiscal doom, many archaic non-
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Thus, the same regulators who have lauded far-reaching
regulations, and who have archly told property owners that
they must bear substantial economic burdens for the good of
society, or the good of the planet, or the good of our children,
are suddenly crying "Foul!" when asked to have their agencies join those owners and share in the burdens for the sake
of the goodness they prescribe for others. Why is the burden
bearable when placed on individual property owners but intolerable when placed on the responsible agencies of the government? After all, apart from being the cause of the loss,
the government has superior ability to spread the cost and
superior resources to bear it until it can be fairly spread.
Ms. Schiffer, while not addressing these issues, asserts
that the current legislative proposals would require "unfair
and unjust" payments, suggesting that owners would be paid
for loss of uses they never had any reasonable expectation of
making, or that they would receive a net benefit from the
regulations even though they could make a reasonable return
on their property anyway."' If those are indeed perceived as
bona fide problems, there is no reason they cannot be dealt
with by suitable amendments to the pending legislation. Yet
none are suggested. That may be so for good reasons. To the
best of our knowledge, no principled and informed spokesperson for the property owners' side has demanded full compensation for every regulatory bump in the road. Moreover, no
one has had the chutzpah to demand legislation that would
confer windfalls for losses not suffered by regulated owners.
No such legislation could ever pass.
The proposed legislation confronts the government and
the populace with the true cost of federal programs. It is all
well and good to report that, as an abstract proposition, a
large majority of Americans favor environmental and species
protection. Of course they do. What sort of person would
come out against "the environment"? But how much are
those same Americans willing to pay to make sure they recompensability rules were abrogated or modified by legislation and court decisions, without the catastrophic sequelae prophesied by condemnors' briefs
throughout the 1960s.
Without revisiting these old battlefields, suffice it to say that the U.S. Supreme Court answered it all in Owen v. City of Independence, 495 U.S. 622, 656
(1980). See also Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963) (holding it is no
defense to say it is cheaper to deny constitutional rights than to afford them).
100. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 162.
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ceive it? At the moment, most of the cost is being fobbed off
on those who fortuitously happen to own highly regulated
land, so that the cost-though quite real-is not reflected in
government budgets and is thus thought of by regulation
proponents as a "freebie." But it isn't. 1 The positive aspect
of the pending legislation is that it makes the true cost of the
program a part of the decision-making process. If the public
balks at spending the money necessary to pay for farreaching environmental programs, and will only support
them on the backs of comparatively few adversely affected
property owners, then perhaps the number of programs, certainly their scope, needs to be reconsidered.
Above all, government functionaries should work earnestly with the regulated to mitigate the economic impact on
them,' thus lowering the economic and demoralization costs
to all concerned, rather than govern by ukase. Such a change
in attitude cannot address the intractable core problems of
regulatory confiscation, but it might do a great deal of good at
the margins. In this connection, officials tend to lose sight of
nurturing the idea that governance is legitimate and essential to the proper functioning of a democratic society, even if
it sometimes involves making unpleasant choices.
In her discussion of the takings legislation pending in
Congress, Ms. Schiffer takes liberties when she asserts that
it would somehow require
payment to dreaded
"corporations" 3 to "ensure the safety of their workers, pay
101. See Arvo Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of IntangibleDetriment: Criteria for Legislative Modernization in California,16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 491, 54394 (1969); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:Comments on the
Ethical Foundation of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1181
(1967).
102. One of the most successful preservation plans (in spite of initial contro-

versy over it) has been the New Jersey Pinelands (also known as "Pine Barrens"), the explanation for this is as follows:
The absence of litigation is attributable to several considerations. The

first is the Pinelands Commission and its staff. While the results of
their efforts have not been satisfying, almost everyone agrees that they
were fair and responsive. When someone had a complaint, he or she
got action, and the Commission exuded an attitude of service quite dis-

tinct from the bureaucratic annoyance that generally tends to characterize resource management-efforts."
BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note 44, at 156.
103. The use of the word "corporations" as an all purpose pejorative term has

unfortunately found a home in political, anti-property, and anti-business rhetoric. But one is entitled to question the propriety of its use by a lawyer in a law

journal. How does the fact that people choose to do business in a corporate
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manufacturers not to dump their waste into the streams that
°4 But that is
run through our neighborhoods, and so forth."
not an accurate depiction of any pending takings bills.
The legislation in question has nothing to do with "water
pollution," at least as that term is understood by persons un015 Water pollututored in the arcana of the EPA regulations.
tion would remain proscribed under the Clean Water Act
which, contrary to Ms. Schiffer's apprehensions, is not being
repealed. Similarly, industrial safety would continue to be
regulated by OSHA and a host of other federal and state
safety legislation. The substantive takings relief legislation,
discussed by Ms. Schiffer, makes explicitly and painstakingly
clear that its provisions are not directed to identifiable safety
hazards, nor to any private activities constituting a nuisance
such as water pollution, nor those that are forbidden by local
zoning laws.0 6 One is entitled to wonder why Ms. Schiffer
form rather than individually, or as a partnership, affect the legitimacy or
merits of their position? That Ms. Schiffer would use such terminology, however, is significant because it resonates the subtext of anti-property rights
ideologues-a phenomenon that afflicts discourse on takings law all too often.
As noted elsewhere in this article, high-level corporate managers are often
the prime exponents of stringent zoning and land-use controls because they and
their posh suburbs are the principal beneficiaries of the present system. See
supra note 44 and accompanying text. Moreover, large corporations usually
adjust to regulations and pass on the increased cost to their customers, though
they may kvetch about it a bit. Thus, the cost of environmental regulations that
affect "corporations" is passed on to the public at large, but in a random and
haphazard way by private entities that understandably look out for themselves
in the process. Would it not be more fair to have the government spread that
cost evenly? The most harshly affected land owners are often individuals from
all walks of life-some of them quite sympathetic. See supra notes 11-13 and
accompanying text. Unlike "corporations," they lack the means to pass the cost
through.
104. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 161.
105. According to the EPA, earth turned over by the blade of a plow used in
cultivating agricultural land is "pollution." See American Mining Congress v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997).
106. House Bill 9, 104th Cong. § 205(a) (1995), provides that "Enlo compensation shall be made under this Act with respect to an agency action the primary
purpose of which is to prevent an identifiable (1) hazard to public health or
safety; or (2) damage to specific property other than the property whose use is
limited." Id. Section 204 of House Bill 9 also provides that "[i]f a use is a nuisance as defined by the law of a State or is already prohibited under a local
zoning ordinance, no compensation shall be made under this division with respect to a limitation on that use." Id. § 204. Similarly, Senate Bill 605, 104th
Cong. (1995), provides "[n]o compensation shall be required by this Act if the
owner's use or proposed use of the property is a nuisance as commonly understood and defined by background principles of nuisance and property law, as
understood within the State in which the property is situated...." Id.
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did not mention that fact in her essay."' Furthermore, the
more recent procedural reform legislation... would only
streamline the present redundant, multi-step administrative
and litigational procedures and require that takings cases be
decided promptly on the merits, with federal courts deciding
federal issues in the first instance.
Since the present state of ripeness law can only be described as an intellectual, and ethical, mess, as attested to by
an outpouring of critical commentaries,19 one would have expected House Bill 1534 to sail through Congress. Instead, it
was the subject of bitter opposition by, among others, the
U.S. Department of Justice whose functionaries opposed it"0
and refused to consider compromise legislative language.
The opposition had it that land owners should not be permitted to sue in federal courts in the first instance, the same as
everyone else, to vindicate their federal constitutional rights,
and that unlike anyone else they should continue to be compelled to try their causes two or three times in state tribunals
107. Unfortunately, this technique of omitting what does not fit a polemical
author's thesis is hardly new in this field. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use
Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981)
(distiguished law professor purported to analyze the law of remedies for regulatory takings, without so much as mentioning any preexisting U.S. Supreme
Court decisional law on remedies for uncompensated takings); see also Norman
Williams et al., The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984)
(sharply attacking Justice Brennan's view that regulatory takings should be
compensable, but without discussing existing U.S. Supreme Court decisional
law on remedies for uncompensated takings, that was contrary to their thesis).
Cf. Michael M. Berger and Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for
Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 685 (1986).
108. Private Property Rights Implementation Act, H.R. 1534, 104th Cong.
(1995).
109. Currently, a property owner must first obtain a "final administrative
decision" from the regulatory body, then do it again if the decision is adverse,
then-if the regulators are state or local entities-sue first in state courts, and
only then, upon an adverse state court decision, sue for the first time in federal
court. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340
(1986); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
Legal commentators have been highly critical of this inefficient, prolix procedure that de facto shuts the door to federal courts to all but the wealthiest
and most determined property owners who under present rules must spend a
decade or so in litigation, and around a million dollars in litigation expenses,
before being admitted to federal court. See infra note 146.
110. See Letter to Sen. Patrick Leahy from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney
General (Aug. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Letter to Sen. Leahy] (on file with
authors).
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before gaining access to federal trial courts.
The position of the Department of Justice on this point
may be something less than ingenuous. Even as the U.S. Supreme Court was deciding City of Chicago v. International
College of Surgeons,"' there was no opposition from the federal government. Indeed, in sharp contrast with all prior
land use/takings cases of the past fifteen years, the Solicitor
General filed no amicus curiae brief.
In opposing House Bill 1534, the Department of Justice
argues that making it easier for landowners to seek redress
of constitutional law violations in federal court directly,
would overburden federal courts."' Thus, one is left to wonder why similar concerns were not voiced when the shoe was
on the other foot, and it was state and local regulatory agencies that wanted these cases decided directly by federal
judges. Does the Department of Justice believe that overburdening of the federal judiciary hinges on which side to the
controversy brings the same matter before a U.S. District
Court? It would certainly so appear.
The plain provisions of the proposed takings laws exempting zoning, nuisances and safety hazards from their
purview have not deterred the spread of disinformation to the
effect that congressional takings legislation would require
compensation to "polluters," or even, as Molly Ivins asserted
in one of her syndicated columns, that it would facilitate the
Such
dumping of cyanide into drinking water supplies."'
111. 118 S. Ct. 423 (1997) (holding that local government agencies may routinely remove to federal court all cases that seek review of land-use and zoning
administrative decisions on constitutional grounds, when the affected land
owners file them in state courts).
112. See Letter to Sen. Leahy, supra note 112.
113. Molly Ivins stated:
The Fifth Amendment rightfully and sensibly says the gummint cannot
seize your property without giving you just compensation. If they want
to take a hunk of your pasture to run a freeway through, they have the
right to pay you fair market value for the land. But suppose you want
to build a cyanide factory on your pasture and dump your waste in the
creek that runs through it, and the gummint says you can't 'cause that
creek flows on down to the city's drinking reservoir? The Republicans
want to give you the right to sue the gummint and make all the rest of
us pay for the money you say you will lose by not bein' able to poison
our drinkin' water.
Molly Ivins, Other Voices: Latest Damage from Nootsville, ATLANTA J. AND
CONST., Feb. 18, 1995, at A18.
Cyanide dumping also made its appearance in an op-ed piece by Donella H.
Meadows in the Los Angeles Times, falsely asserting that takings legislation
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falsehoods may be the deplorable fare of op-ed propagandists
in today's "negative campaigning" public discourse,"' but
they have no foundation in reality and no legal substance.
That unscrupulous, partisan polemicists peddle such disinformation to alarm the public is expectable, if regrettable." 5
The harsh reality is that the last quarter century's
mushrooming property regulations, and their recent extreme
manifestations" ' have by degrees begun treating constituwould permit the dumping of cyanide waste into the Connecticut River.
Donella H. Meadows, Pay Me to Be Good-Or I'll Sue, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1995, at B7.
And who can forget the Toles cartoon in The New Republic depicting sludge
coming out of a kitchen faucet, accompanied by the line, "Now I'm free to dump
waste oil in our watershed"? NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 27, 1995, at 8.
114. See, e.g., Dan Gordon, The Environment vs. Property Rights: Want a
Toxic Dump Next Door?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at A25 (falsely asserting
that under the proposed takings legislation taxpayers would have to pay a
landowner when a zoning rule, inter alia, limits the value of land). As noted at
supra note 106, the takings legislation quite explicitly exempts zoning.
For a similarly bogus depiction of the proposed takings legislation, see Robert H. Sulnick, ConstitutionFaces a Triple Threat, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, at
M4 (stating, in addition to the standard line about factory owners polluting water with impunity and threats to local zoning, that "[t]he insurance industry
and doctors could claim that lost profits related to health-care legislation are a
'taking,' and therefore warrant reimbursement by the federal government").
Though not specifically directed at takings legislation, see also Douglas T.
Kendall & James E. Ryan, The Right Can'tHave It Both Ways, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
8, 1998, at M5 (asserting that the "property campaign" asks judges to overturn
'a wide variety of health, safety and environmental laws based on expansive
definition of the term 'take'").
115. For a vivid example, see an unsigned document distributed by the
American Planning Association, under cover of a "Dear Colleague" letter from
Michael B. Barker, Executive Director, dated September 27, 1995, complete
with a pre-drafted lobbying letter and a "Sample 'Takings' Op-Ed", asserted
that "[u]nder this distorted view [of the takings legislation] the public, in having to compensate for 'takings,' would have to pay industry not to pollute because environmental restrictions could reduce potential profits." Michael B.
Barker, How Land Use Planning, Regulations and Zoning Protect Property
Rights: Why "Takings" Measures Would Harm Property Rights (Sept. 27, 1995)
(sample op-ed letter on file with authors).
Warming to its task, the APA document goes on to assert that "[b]y preventing government from regulating where a hazardous waste facility could be
located, 'takings' laws could encourage the siting of these facilities in minority
and low-income neighborhoods." Id. at 6.
Of course, nothing in the pertinent takings legislation justifies such extravagantly untrue assertions. This legislation does not deal with pollution and
it certainly does not regulate siting of hazardous waste facilities.
116. We offer as a paradigmatic example a case where the regulation in
question forbade all improvements on the last two residential lots in the builtup beachfront community of Isle of Palms, leaving their owner, the unfortunate
David Lucas, with the obligation to pay taxes, service his mortgage, and bear
other burdens and liabilities of property ownership, but without any ability to
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" 11
tional rights of property owners as a "poor relation. 7
Regulators deem such rights as unworthy of protection on
par with other rights, and not even deserving of being fairly
balanced against a host of regulations, some of which have
little to do with public health, safety, welfare or morals"'-

put his land to any economically rational use whatever. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Such regulatory extremism was
widely defended by environmentalists and government lawyers as just and
proper, while Lucas was depicted as an extremist out to destroy all property
regulation. See Gideon Kanner, Lucas and the Press:How to be Politically Correct on the Taking Issue, in AFTER LUCAS: LAND USE REGULATION AND THE
TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION 102 (David L. Callies ed., 1993).
Ironically, after South Carolina acquired those two lots by settlement of
Lucas' inverse condemnation action, it promptly turned around and sold them
to a developer who proceeded to build the very homes that Lucas had been forbidden to build. The state regulators' environmental zeal thus lasted only as
long as they thought they could stick Lucas with the cost of the proverbial free
lunch. But when faced with the tab themselves, preservation of Lucas' lots
suddenly ceased being environmentally important. See Robert Aalberts, Whatever Happened to David Lucas?, 25 REAL EST. L. J. (1997) (unpaginated editorial appearing before page 214); Gideon Kanner, Not With a Bang, But a Giggle:
The Settlement of the Lucas Case, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 308 (David L.
Callies ed., 1996).
117. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
118. The most obvious example being the familiar NIMBY syndrome,
whereby affluent suburbanites, purporting to "save the environment," use ostensibly environmental concerns to push through land-use regulations (by initiative if necessary) that raise the regulatory drawbridges to their upscale
communities through building caps, "slow growth" measures and moratoria
that in effect protect the privileged status and life style of those already owning
homes in desirable areas. See FRIEDEN, supra note 43; William Tucker, Environmentalism and the Leisure Class, HARPER'S, Dec. 1977, at 49.
In fact, environmentally desirable communities look nothing like Bel Air or
Hillsborough, California. Rather, they depend significantly on moderate to high
density multiple-family housing and efficient public transportation-both
anathema to the denizens of the likes of Tiburon or Rancho Palos Verdes, California.
The use of environmentally-minded regulations as a justification for reducing housing supplies has resulted in California suffering the highest housing
costs in the nation, in spite of its plentiful supplies of land, water and other resources necessary for construction of badly needed homes, particularly of more
affordable housing. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS 218-52 (1995). This burden of excessive housing costs falls most
heavily on those least able to afford it, and tends to reduce their standard of
living. Two presidential commissions have studied the problem, and both found
high levels of land-use regulation and the NIMBY syndrome to be implicated in
excessively high housing costs.
Ironically, though pursued in the name of environmental values, such misuse of the environmental ethic has contributed to urban sprawl because unable
to build where most people want to live, and faced with ongoing demand-after
all, young people and immigrants have to live somewhere-developers move on
to the urban periphery where land is cheaper, regulations are less severe and
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the conceptual underpinnings of the state regulatory police
power. The environmentalists' successful, if unjustified, depiction of concerned land owners as unworthy rednecks being
manipulated by large business interests, was bound to produce a backlash and inspire well-founded demands for legislation balancing the harsh decrees of the regulatory state
against private property interests.
Perfectly legitimate environmental considerations exist
to justify legislation requiring major changes in our past
ways of living and doing business, and the government may
well step in to enact it. But these changes exact costs, and it
is quite proper for the legislature to make the judgment that,
beyond a certain level of private losses, these costs should be
properly shared by society at large as a quid pro quo for the
benefits received at the expense of a minority of private property owners. In other words, though the government has the
power to govern harshly, an enlightened society bears the responsibility of seeing to it that the governance is not just effective but also wise and fair."9 Justice Holmes, in rephrasing the eternal verity that there is no such thing as a free
lunch, once stated:
[T]he state has an interest independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air in its domain.
It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped of their forests and inhabitants shall breathe
pure air. It might have to pay individuals before it could
utter that word, but with it remains the final power. 2 0
The fact that government regulations may be of great
benefit to society does not address the separate question of
the means by which those benefits should be achieved. 2'
Were we writing on a clean slate, a host of approaches could
be conjured up, some no doubt effective, even if draconian.
But we are not writing on a clean slate; the Constitution as
well as the political ethics that underlie it must be respected
there are no "NIMBY!" shouting neighbors.
119. This is in keeping with the observation attributed to St. Thomas More,
that the office of the King's Chancellor is to tell the sovereign not what he can
do, but rather what he should do.
120. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (emphasis
added).
121. This basic idea has been repeatedly stressed by the Supreme Court.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425 (1982);
United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979).
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and those ethics reject confiscation as a measure of justice.'22
What that means in practice is that the cost of improving
the public condition, as Justice Holmes put it, requires fair
spreading of the resulting harsh economic burdens, and doing
so without economic shortcuts.' 3 That concept lies at the
heart of the Takings Clause. Furthermore, to the extent the
courts' interpretation of its minimal provisions leaves large
individual losses uncompensated, there is nothing wrong
with legislation that grants compensation to aggrieved property owners above the constitutional minimum'24 when their
losses reach a high enough level even though that level may
fall short of a total, or near-total, wipeout required to trigger
This apcompensation under today's judge-made law.'
proach is no different than that of current civil rights statutes that establish standards of government conduct higher
than the bare minimum mandated by the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. As for another,
more closely analogous example, the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act" 6 provides for compensation for a number of private losses inflicted by eminent domain takings that are
deemed constitutionally noncompensable by the courts.
Ms. Schiffer is within her prerogatives to question the
level at which protection of property rights should be legislatively drawn. She may well quarrel with the wisdom of using
this or that percentage decline in property value caused by
the regulation as the compensatory trigger."' But surely,

122. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949).
123. "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40 (1960) (holding that the purpose of the Just Compensation clause is
to bar government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in fairness and justice, should be borne by the public at large); Holtz v.
Superior Court, 475 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1970) (finding that the decisive consideration is whether the owner of the damaged property if uncompensated would
contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking).
124. See Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 676-77 (1923)
(stating that legislatures are free to set compensation levels above the constitutionally required minimum).
125. See e.g., Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir.
1979) (deeming loss of ninety-five percent of the subject property's value constitutionally noncompensable and insufficient to establish a taking).
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1994).
127. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 160.
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some magnitude of a decline in value must command her assent to the proposition that the regulation has gone too far
and that compensation is mandated. Even the current
grudging takings jurisprudence considers destruction of reasonable investment backed expectations as a criterion of
taking.'28 One is thus entitled to ask what level of regulatory
destruction of such expectations, or of the property's value,
would be sufficiently great to warrant legislatively decreed
compensation. If a 33% loss in value is too low, would 50% do
the trick? How about 75%?129 Nothing in Ms. Schiffer's essay

acknowledges that anything short of a total 100% wipeout
requires compensation, and even that with qualifications. 3 °
Hers is an advocate's legalistic position. The courts'
harsh formulation has bestowed a legal advantage on her client, and so she, understandably, wants to preserve that advantage."' But she overlooks the fact that courts are not the
128. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
The Supreme Court has held that the impact on such expectations can be so
severe as to result in a taking by itself. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1005 (1984). Or, in the words of two knowledgeable commentators:
"[R]estrictions on use may so frustrate reasonable development expectations
that compensation is required, even though beneficial uses of the property remain following enactment of the regulation." JOHN SHONKWILER & TERRY
MORGAN, LAND USE LITIGATION 182 (1986).
129. What has gone without note by regulation hawks disparaging "mere"
diminution in value, is that real property is widely and usually held by its owners subject to loans secured by mortgages or deeds of trust, so that a catastrophic decline in value typically wipes out the entire equity. The nominal
owners of the land in question may then continue to hold title but in reality own
nothing of utility or value. As the New York Court of Appeals once put it: under such circumstances, outright confiscation of the land would leave the owners better off because it would at least relieve them of the obligation to pay
property taxes. See Arverne Bay v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (N.Y. 1938).
130. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 160-61. Ms. Schiffer relies on Concrete Pipe
Prod. v. ConstructionLaborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993), from whose
language she seeks to derive comfort. But the Court was explicit in Concrete
Pipe that it was rejecting "Concrete Pipe's contention that the analytical
framework is the one employed in our cases dealing with permanent physical
occupation or destruction of economically beneficial use of real property." Id. at
605. Applying Concrete Pipe's reasoning to land regulation cases would seem a
dubious proposition. For more extensive discussion, see Michael M. Berger,
Yes, Virginia, There Can Be PartialTakings, in TAKINGS: LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFrER DOLAN AND LuCAS 148, 159-61

(David L. Callies ed., 1996).
131. Perhaps familiarity breeds disregard, but there is an inscription on a
wall in the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. which reads: "The
United States wins its point whenever justice is done one of its citizens in the
courts." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Government lawyers are
mandated to seek justice, not necessarily victory. That is an ethical mandate as
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only source of law; legislatures are the primary lawmakers.
Legislatures are also responsible for the public purse, both in
terms of raising and spending public funds, and thus would
seem to be the appropriate institution to lay down criteria
dictating when compensation is called for above the constitutional minimum.
According to the Supreme Court, the law of eminent domain is "harsh" and relief from its harshness should be
sought from Congress.132 It was the federal government that
thus persuaded the court to defer to the legislature as the
source of gentling the decisional takings law's harshness.
Thus, it is disingenuous for Ms. Schiffer to argue that when
aggrieved Americans do exactly what the Supreme Court
suggested, and turn to Congress for relief, Congress should
nonetheless leave them to the tender mercies of the "harsh"
law fashioned by the courts at government's behest.'33
Finally, Ms. Schiffer complains that the takings legislation is flawed because its "loss-in-value trigger focuses solely
on the affected portion of the property."134 She argues that
"the courts have made clear that under the Constitution,
fairness and justice require an examination of the regulaBut even on that
tion's impact on the parcel as a whole."'
premise, Ms. Schiffer makes an argument that proves too
much, certainly in the context of a debate whether the Congress should rectify this judicially-created anomaly.
well. Some courts have taken this mandate to mean that a condemnor acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity imposing special obligations of fairness toward property
owners. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1976).
132. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 382 (1945).
133. To the extent Ms. Schiffer argues that takings legislation may call for
"unfair and unjust" levels of compensation that is higher than the landowners'
actual losses, Schiffer, supra note 1, at 161-62, she ignores not only the fact
that the takings legislation says no such thing, but also the principle of eminent
domain valuation law holding that the condemnee (whether direct or inverse) is
entitled only to compensation for net, demonstrable losses. As Justice Holmes
put it in Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910), "the
question is: 'What has the owner lost?'"
Valuation law is also quite clear that any benefits generated by the government project necessitating the taking, that are reflected in the remaining
property's post-taking value, are offset against the value of the severance damages, and in federal law against the value of the part taken. United States v.
Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1939). That is hornbook law. See
JACQuEs B. GELIN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT

DOMAIN 166 (1982). Of course, if the taking is total, there are no post-taking
benefits to the owner, so the problem does not arise in the first place.
134. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 161.
135. Id.
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"Takings jurisprudence," the Supreme Court's body of inverse condemnation law, consists largely of takings of easements and, thus, stands opposed to this proposition. In 1978,
the Penn Central Court, without any explication of doctrine
or citation of authority, asserted that "takings jurisprudence
does not divide a parcel into discrete segments."136 That may
have made the Court's job easier to decide Penn Central in
favor of the government, but it was inconsistent with the
then existing "takings jurisprudence." Were this the law, the
government could acquire passive or negative easements in
private property 1 7 without compensation, simply by decreeing that the owner of the affected land refrain from improving or even using the part of it covered by such an easement
for any economically rational use.
But when the court spoke in Penn Central, its taking jurisprudence contained no such rule. Had the court made
even a cursory examination of its own prior jurisprudence
this would have revealed at once that most of the successful
takings cases involved takings of easements-quintessential
partial takings, both qualitatively and quantitatively.1 38 Indeed, the Supreme Court decided at least two cases after
Penn Central, in which it deemed government regulations to
be takings, even though
both involved partial regulatory
89
takings of easements.
To the extent one can argue that the preexisting cases of
partial takings of easements were physical rather than
regulatory, there are two responses. First, the court did not
ascribe any significance to that dichotomy in Penn Central; it
was not even mentioned. Second, it is difficult to see on what
doctrinal basis it can be said that what is plainly a taking,
albeit a partial one, is not a taking at all when prior case
law-to say nothing of common sense-makes clear that it
is."' It is indefensible to argue that the existence of a taking
136. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
137. Common examples would be avigation easements, scenic easements or
highway sight easements that under settled law have to be condemned and
paid for. See generally Sneed v. City of Riverside, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Ct. App.
1963) (finding a compensable taking where a height limit regulation of land
near municipal airport secured an avigation easement for the city).
138. The granddaddy of all regulatory takings cases involved a partial taking
of mineral rights. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
139. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
140. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946); United States v.
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vel non depends not on the confiscatory effect of the government regulatory action, but on the means the government
chooses to employ to effect it. More importantly, a scant
three years after Penn Central, Justice Brennan, the author
of the majority opinion, rejected the physical versus nonphysical taking distinction in no uncertain terms:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and
other land use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just
as effectively as formal condemnation of property. From
the property owner's point of view, it may matter little
whether his land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is
restricted by regulation to use in its natural state, if the
in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial use of
effect
1
4

it.1

But be that as it may, the Court certainly had the raw
power to so decree. As a result, its doctrinally and logically
unfounded assertion that takings jurisprudence does not divide a parcel into discrete segments, has given rise to
4
anomalies that the court itself duly noted in Lucas. ' There
is thus nothing wrong with Congress rectifying these anomaThe fact that Ms. Schiffer
lies by appropriate legislation.'
seems to prefer the present state of the law that heavily favors government regulators, is hardly a sound basis for resisting the legislative enactment of clearer, fairer and more
doctrinally sound liability standards than the present muddle. While we do not wish to be unkind, it is entirely proper
to allude again to Chief Judge Traynor's incisive observation
Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (1911) (holding that not only is just compensation payable for a partial taking, but also for severance damages to the remainder of the
partially taken property).
141. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
For a collection of scholarly denunciations of the physical versus nonphysical distinction in determining whether a taking has occurred (in terms such as
"primordial," "outmoded," "anachronistic," and "primitive"), see Michael M.
Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regulate-Is That the Question?, 8 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 253, 268 (1975).
142. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7
(1992).
143. As California's late Chief Judge Roger Traynor once observed, there are
notions embedded in the law "that have never been cleaned and pressed and
might disintegrate if they were." Roger Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It
Justice, 49 CAL. L. REV. 615, 621 (1961). The Penn Central "non-segmentation"
theory certainly qualifies as one such notion. See generally Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
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in which he was critical of "bogus defenders of stare decisis"
who try to alarm the courts and the public to forestall needed
14 4
reform in the law.
Then there is the currently pending procedural legislation. Unlike the bills attacked by Ms. Schiffer, House Bill
1534 makes no substantive legal changes. This legislation,
called the "Private Property Rights Implementation Act of
1997," might just as easily have been named the "Fairness in
Access to the Courts Act of 1997," or the "Let the Federal
Courts Decide Federal Constitutional Issues Act of 1997." In
fact, either would probably have been more accurate-and
may have made the bill less controversial. The bill does not
deal substantively with property rights per se, but with the
right of property owners to have access to the federal courts
to determine the merits of their federal constitutional claims
against local, typically zoning, bodies. At the same time, it
properly instructs federal courts not to defer to state courts
on issues of federal constitutional law.
The purpose of the bill is not to "implement" or create
any specific private property rights or to impinge on or reduce any protections provided by other substantive laws to
people, air, water, plants, or animals. It is neither the twin
nor the step-child of the property rights bills already considered by Congress, which did attempt to draw some clear substantive lines to define when property owners would be entitled to compensation. House Bill 1534 would only permit
property owners who claim that local government action has
violated their federal constitutional rights (under substantive
rules and precepts established by the courts, not by this legislation) to have a federal judge decide whether they are right
or wrong. The bill is simply about fair access to federal
courts.
The legislation addresses only the procedural and remedial attributes of actions challenging regulatory decisions of
state and local regulators. Much of the regulatory taking
litigation is fomented by local government agencies that usually have a decided preference for litigating in the comfortable confines of their local trial courts-the ones that they
fund, and with whose personnel they are familiar. "5 In
144. Traynor, supra note 143, at 621.
145. Note, however, that when local regulators conclude that the federal
courts in their bailiwick are hostile to property owners, and decide to do a little
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states where development versus preservation conflicts are at
a high level (California and Florida being obvious examples),
local state courts have by and large gone along with their desires. For years, property owners' urgent need to have their
federal constitutional claims heard by federal district courts,
has been severely restricted by the use, or more accurately
misuse, of the ripeness doctrine.'4 6 This has placed them, as
a group, in the position of some sort of second class citizenship.
Space prohibits a full explication of the procedural pitfalls and conundrums facing property owners who want no
more than to have federal constitutional issues decided by
federal judges. The commentaries cited have already consumed enough trees expounding on that issue.'4 7 Thus,
House Bill 1534 represents needed and long overdue reform.
This pending procedural legislation should not concern
Ms. Schiffer and her colleagues at the Department of Justice,
as it deals only with the ability of property owners to sue local state agencies in federal courts and thus has no direct
impact on the work of the Department of Justice. In keeping
with her statement of support from her entire department for
forum shopping by removing the owners' takings claims to federal courts, they
have been permitted to do so. City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 118 S. Ct. 423 (1997); Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir.
1995). In what can only be described as a morally scandalous performance, the
Tari court proceeded to lecture the plaintiff on the impropriety of making federal courts "'master zoning boards' in disputes which are best handled at the
local level," ignoring the plain fact that the plaintiff had indeed filed his lawsuit
in the state courts, but it was removed against his wishes to federal court by the
defendant county. Id. at 1534, 1537.
146. Commentators have often been overwhelmingly scornful of its parameters and its application, as is quite apparent from the titles of their works: Michael M. Berger, The "Ripeness"Mess in Federal Land-Use Cases: How the Supreme Court Converted Federal Judges Into Fruit Peddlers, 1991 S.W. LEGAL
FOUND. INST. ON PLANNING, ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN 7 (1991); Brian W.

Blaesser, Closing the Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness and
Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73
(1988); Timothy J. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the JudicialRelegation
of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1992);
Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Takings Clause:A Survey of
Decisions Showing Just How FarFederal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating
Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91 (1994); Bruce I. Wiener, Obstacles and Pitfalls for Landowners Applying the Ripeness Doctrine to Section
1983 Land Use Litigation,7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 387 (1992).

147. See Daniel R. Mandelker & Michael M. Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG. 1, 3 (1990) (urging that the federal courts are the proper place to
decide federal questions).
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procedural reform, one would hope there would be federal
backing for this bill, or at least that the Department would
not oppose it as it has no legitimate reason for doing so. As
she put it: "The [Department of Justice] is committed to
working with the courts to ensure that takings claims may be
resolved quickly and efficiently ... ""'
Sadly, although perhaps predictably, that is not the case.
The Department of Justice works "with the courts" all right,
but in the role of a hard-nosed advocate. Even as House Bill
1534 was being passed by the House of Representatives, Department's opposition to it was unyielding; its officials would
not discuss any compromise legislative language, and bluntly
rebuffed suggestions that Department do so. The hard-nosed
advocacy posture was all too evident.
IV. POLICY, NOT POLEMICS, NEEDS TO GUIDE OVERDUE
LEGISLATIVE REFORM

Much has been said and written about the "taking issue,"
and it is not our intention to duplicate here the efforts of
scholars, students, and practitioners-and not a few polemicists-trying to plumb the depths of the inconsistent and at
times bewildering "takings jurisprudence" in an effort to
make sense of it. In this debate, even apart from the unfairness that application of the "black letter" takings rules so often impose, it seems to us that insufficient attention has been
paid to broader considerations. The debate as to whether
Congress and state legislatures should intervene to rectify
the muddled handiwork of judges needs to focus less on the
environmentalists' apocalyptic visions of an unregulated
world on one hand, and Ms. Schiffer's "horror stories" on the
other,'49 though neither should be dismissed altogether.
148. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 159.
149. Schiffer, supra note 1, at 162-64. In setting out to refute these "horror
stories," Ms. Schiffer discusses only two anecdotes in which she asserts that the
complaining landowners had overstated their cases. Id. at 162. That, however,
hardly touches the surface of such problems. It cannot go without notice that in
the case that planted the seeds of the "ripeness mess," it took the land owners
almost thirty years of litigation, moratoria, and crude municipal foot-draggingto get permission from the city of Tiburon to build only three houses, the first of
which is being completed as of this writing, and in which Ms. Agins can no
longer afford to live. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); see also
Charles Gallardo, After 29 Years, Tiburon House Going Up: Home OK'd But Not
For OriginalFamily, MARIN INDEPENDENT J., Oct. 1, 1997, at 1; Philip Hager,
Courting a Dream: 20-Year Fight to Build Tiburon Home Not Over Yet, L.A.
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We need to focus more on the long term effects of landuse regulations. In particular, the increasingly intrusive and
mushrooming impact of those effects needs to be comprehended and reevaluated. 5 ° Starting with the modest proposition that incompatible land uses may properly be separated
by zoning laws, lest their juxtaposition create nuisances,
given to us by the U.S. Supreme Court a scant seventy-two
years ago,"1 land-use law has run amok."' Zoning and the
countless land-use regulations have at times assumed the air
of a fundamentalist religion, complete with official dogma,
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1987, at A3.
150. Since such a suggestion is usually deemed by regulators to be in the nature of heresy, we note that the city of Houston, Texas, has no zoning, but looks
no significantly different than other cities in the region, of similar size and age.
Could it be that the fiercely complicated and costly zoning apparatus could
stand reexamination when it turns out that for all its cost, time consumption,
complexity, inefficiency and frequent corruption, it produces cities that look no
different than Houston? See generally BERNARD SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT
ZONING (1972); Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and FinesAs Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); Richard
A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong with Euclid, 5
ENVTL. L.J. 277 (1996); Douglas Kmiec, DeregulatingLand Use: An Alternative
Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. (1981); Jan Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719 (1980); George Lefcoe, California's Land PlanningRegulations: The Case for Deregulation, 54 So. CAL. L.
REV. 447 (1981); Mark Pulliam, BrandeisBrief for Deregulationof Land Use: A
Pleafor ConstitutionalReform, 13 SW. U. L. REV. 435 (1983).
151. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). When Euclid was
originally tried, Judge Westenhaver who presided over the trial, presciently
concluded that for all its benefits in separating incompatible land uses, the true
purpose of zoning was to segregate the population of a community according to
income or situation in life. Ambler Realty v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316
(N.D. Ohio 1924).
152. Richard A. Epstein, PropertyAs a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W.
L. REV. 187, 203 (1992). As of this writing, the City of Glendale, California has
just cited a homeowner for putting up a 3 1/2-foot white picket fence around his
lawn to keep cars from running over it, instead of the regulation 18-inch fence.
John Steinman, Couple Fights Over Bit of Americana, L.A. TIMES (Valley ed.),
Jan. 13, 1998, at B1. The latter height, says the city with what purports to be a
straight face, is to protect views. Id.
There have even been cases where local zoning authorities have harassed
little kids selling lemonade in front of their homes in the summertime. For example, in Massachusetts land-use officials shut down a lemonade stand of 10year old Hillary Carey, who was later permitted to reopen it after payment of
$100 for a town hawker's license, $62 for a state license, $25 "base of operation"
health department inspection, and another $50 for the health department's inspection of her two coolers. See LANDPLANNER 12 (Fall 1996). Another example
occurred in Watchung, New Jersey, where authorities forced 10-year old Max
Schilling to pay a $250 fee for a variance application to permit the operation of
a lemonade stand in front of his parents' house. Young Lemonade Maven Eases
Out of Squeezes, MIAMI HERALD, July 8, 1990.
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true believers, and despised heretics. These days, there is
very little that can be done with one's land without obtaining
some sort of permit or license, indulgence, or entitlement
from the government whether local, regional, state, federal or
all of the above. Government land use regulations now cover
everything from setbacks to home size, architectural styles,
fencing, landscaping, lighting, plumbing and roof materials,
the color one may paint one's house, and whether storekeepers must hire security guards at their expense instead of relying on the police to suppress crime. 5 ' In California, the law
may now require builders to put "public art" into their private projects, with the artistic content subject to approval by
the local municipality, not the builders who are nonetheless
required to pay for whatever the city likes, never mind the
builders' First Amendment rights.'
Many of today's land-use regulations bear no rational
relationship to public health, safety, welfare or morals-the
conceptual underpinnings of the state police power said to
justify all that. In some areas they are a manifestation of a
new feudalism that favors persons in accordance with their
status:"'5 existing homeowners are preferred to outsiders not
yet living in the community and to owners who have not yet
built on their land. As Professor Fischel astutely observed,
these new arrangements, though unsanctioned by any law,
have de facto effected a massive wealth transfer from owners
of vacant land to home owners."' In the regulatory regime
that prevails in many places, notably California, the latter
can often prevent the former from improving their landeither in an economically rational fashion or sometimes completely. All this, of course, infuses the seemingly mundane
municipal land-use approval process with unwarranted and
153. This feat is accomplished by use-or more accurately misuse-of land
use regulations, whereby security requirements are imposed as conditions of
the storekeeper's conditional use permit under which the store operates.
Gideon Kanner, Blaming the Victims, L.A. TIMES (Valley ed.) Apr. 3, 1994, at
B17.
154. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (Cal. 1996); Gideon
Kanner, Tennis Anyone? How CaliforniaJudges Made Land Ransom and Art
CensorshipLegal, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 214, 231-36 (1997).
155. DENNIS COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 116, 118
(1993); see also John McClaughry, The New Feudalism, 5 ENVTL. L. 675, 701-02
(1975).
156. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS 251 (1995).
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at times illegitimate power over the lives of citizens whose
economic well-being and hence their civic liberties increaswhimsical exercise of the muingly depend on the at times
15
1
nicipal regulatory power.
As even staunch defenders of the current land-use regulatory system have had to acknowledge, in practice, the land
use approval process is too often characterized by "one might
almost say, the art, of delay, delay, equivocation and neverending 'negotiation'. . . . These actions are ubiquitous, vicious, and devoid of any resemblance of procedural due process .... Moreover, many local governments seem to relish
prolonged administrative turmoil before reaching a decision
from which judicial relief may be sought."158
These are matters of no concern to Ms. Schiffer, who, as
government lawyer, is not required to deal with
federal
a
them. Yet, they are of enormous and widespread importance,

157. A perfect example and an object lesson is provided by recent events in
Burbank, California. There is a controversy in that community as to whether
the Hollywood-Burbank Airport should be expanded, and the local Chamber of
Commerce took a position favoring expansion which is opposed by most Burbank officials. Jill Leovy, Burbank Studios Repudiate Vote on Airport Expansion, L.A. TIMES (Valley ed.), May 14, 1997, at Al. Within days, three Chamber
members repudiated the Chamber's position and wrote groveling letters of
apology to the City Council, promising not to do it again. Id. Who were these
meek "little" entities, so easily intimidated by the very prospect of a conflict
with City Hall? They were NBC, Warner Brothers, and Disney Studioscollectively, probably the most powerful force in American media and communications. Id. Why did these mighty enterprises so abase themselves? All three
of them have major construction projects and expansion plans in Burbank, and
they evidently thought it prudent to subordinate their views on a matter of
community interest, to currying favor with officials with the power to pass on
their land-use entitlements. Id. Ironically, the Chamber of Commerce was on
the right side of this issue; as of this writing the Los Angeles County Superior
Court ruled that the airport may be expanded by the joint powers authority operating it without Burbank's consent. Andrew Blenkstein, Burbank Can't Block
Airport Plan, Judge Says, L.A. TIMES (Valley ed.), Feb. 19, 1998, at Al.
Though their caving in to City Hall was chilling, unfortunately, NBC, Warner Brothers, and Disney probably acted prudently. The nearby City of Los
Angeles recently denied approval for construction of a new golf course (that had
been approved by the planning commission) in order to exact revenge against
the developer's financing company that became involved in a dispute with a
municipally well-connected labor union. Hugo Martin, City Council Votes Down
Big Tujunga Golf Course, L.A. TIMES (Valley ed.), July 23, 1997, at Al. Predictably, the developer has sued the city, and the city council "staring down the
barrel of a $215 million lawsuit" is reconsidering the development application.
Editorial, The Tujunga Washout, L.A. TIMES (Valley ed.), Feb. 15, 1998, at B16.
158. Norman Williams et al., The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L.
REV. 193, 242-43 (1984).
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and they can and do implicate takings problems, particularly
when the ostensible regulations work to deprive the affected
land owners of all or most of their property. While the
pending federal takings legislation does not address these local problems (except to the extent that House Bill 1534 restores aggrieved land owners' reasonable access to federal
courts), its adoption would nonetheless send a wholesome
message to the entire country that property rights are to be
treated with the seriousness their importance and constitutionally protected status requires.
We are unable to improve on the astute observation of
Justice Potter Stewart that personal liberties and property
rights are interdependent and neither can have meaning
without the other.'59 That he was right is attested to by the
fact that there are no societies in which a high degree of personal and political liberties does not correlate strongly with a
similarly high degree of economic freedom. A powerful lesson
flows from that fact that needs to be heeded. Particularly
since the current harsh regulations are often justified on the
grounds that they tend to enhance the environment, another
lesson that needs to be learned is that it is governmentmanaged societies whose citizens lack liberty-personal, political and economic-that wound up with the worst environmental degradation, while democratic, free market oriented societies enjoy both a higher level of environmental
amenities and greater liberties for their citizens.
However arguably worthy the sweep of the countless
land-use regulations may be, many of them are arbitrary and
some simply do not work efficiently, fairly, or sometimes at
all. Though laws and regulations that control land-use in a
given community are voluminous, it turns out all too often
that this mass of "official" verbiage provides little reliable
guidance to persons seeking to develop land or even build a
house. Instead of a rule of law embodied in all that paper,
land-use is actually governed by what even elementary texts
call a "dealmaking process."6 ' When it comes to land-use, the
vaunted "rule of law" that enjoys such currency in afterluncheon speeches, turns out all too often to operate more
like a bazaar. Nothing is what it seems; everything is up for
159. Lynch v. Households Fin. Co., 405 U.S. 538, 543-48 (1972).
160. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. JAMES TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 23480 (1981).
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grabs. Seemingly clear laws prove to have the substantiality
of cotton candy when vocal NIMBY-shouting homeowners decide that they simply don't want anyone else on or even near
"their" turf.'61 In short, as practiced today in many communities land-use "law" is often anything but law, with predictably corrosive effects on public perception of the integrity of
the legal process.
As far as the courts are concerned, they traditionally do
not pass on the wisdom of governmental arrangements, and
so it is understandable, though not commendable, that at
times they have improvidently gone along with absurd government actions and land-use regulations.'6 2 But there are
limits to everything. When regulations reach the level of the
confiscatory, it is essential that a society that means to remain free draw a line. In the takings area, the courts have
acted with callous insensitivity to vital economic interests
and constitutional rights of faultless citizens subjected to
predatory government practices, and have failed in the task
of delimiting government power, even though, as Justice
Holmes put it, the great body of the law consists of drawing
"'
lines. 63
The courts have not performed that function effectively or even competently. Instead, even the U.S. Supreme
Court-in theory a court of precedent, not of error-has given
us a mode of constitutional decision-making that it itself has
characterized as ad hoc, factual adjudication on a case-bycase basis.' Excuse us for asking, but is that what the Justices believe to be a "rule of law"? If they sincerely do, then it
would appear that they have lost the ability to differentiate
161. For a detailed description of what started out as a perfectly proper plan
to build a mid-rise office building complex in full compliance with applicable
zoning, but after objection by local NIMBY homeowners ended eight years later
as a protracted, slow-motion litigational nightmare that ended in insolvency
after wasting between $40 and $50 million to no purpose whatever, see Robert
I. McMurry & Gideon Kanner, Shootout at Warner Ridge, Los ANGELES LAW.,
Jan. 1995, at 24; see also James F. Peltz, Bumps on the Road to Warner Ridge,
L.A. TIMES (Valley ed.), Mar. 2, 1993, at 3.
162. There are many worthy candidates for recognition in this regard, but
the authors' favorite is McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 264 P.2d 932
(Cal. 1953), where the California Supreme Court upheld an ordinance forbidding all construction on a beachfront lot on the fatuous ground that construction of a home on pilings would encourage immoral behavior underneath the
structure.
163. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dis-

senting).
164. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438.1.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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between the function of a common-law judge and that of a
Kadi sitting under a tree, dispensing subjective justice by the
seat of his pantaloons. 6' The proverbial bottom line is that
the Supreme Court has created an illusion of relief by its decisions whose all too apparent subtext has been obviously
read by many lower courts as a license to deny enforcement
of constitutional rights of American landowners in a majority
of cases.
In part, this regrettable state of affairs is due to the unfortunate structural problem in American takings law,
whereby absent an intermediate legislatively-established
level of relief, judge-made law requires a choice between
finding a taking, or providing no remedy at all.'66 It does not
have to be that way, but unfortunately it is since the courts
have largely gone out of the business of enforcing substantive
property rights under the Due Process Clause.'67 Throw into
the litigational picture Penn Central's doctrinally deficient
"non-segmentation" rule, and takings cases become all-ornothing propositions in more ways than one. Prevailing in a
regulatory taking case these days, even on egregious facts,
can be in the nature of the scriptural feat of leading a camel
through the eye of a needle, particularly in jurisdictions like
California whose courts are notorious for being openly hostile
to private property rights. 8 A middle ground is needed and
the proposed congressional legislation provides it, both as a
solution to the substantive constitutional problem created by
the Supreme Court, and in the case of House Bill 1534 as an
efficient means of providing aggrieved property owners with
165. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 8 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
166. During the nineteenth century, a number of states amended their constitutions to provide for compensation when private property is taken or damaged for public use. California is one of them. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. But
apart from physical damaging, the "or damaged" clause has turned out to be a
toothless tiger, as far as confiscatory regulations are concerned. HFH, Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237, 243-45 (Cal. 1975).
167. Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321-26 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
168. In his noted treatise, Norman Williams (a strongly pro-regulation
textwriter) opined that "[t]he striking feature of California law is that the
courts in that state have quite consistently been far rougher on the property
rights of developers than those in any other state." NORMAN WILLIAMS, 1
AMERICAN PLANNING LAw 184 (1974). A national survey of land-use experts of
all substantive orientations revealed that California was a nearly unanimous
choice as the state least likely to protect the rights of land owners. DENNIS
COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1995).
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a neutral federal forum, precisely as envisioned by the constitutional framers." 9 This legislation may also serve as an inspiration to the states.
After years of quite deliberate judicial obfuscation of
takings law in ways that have heavily favored the government, there is no solution in sight capable of satisfying the
regulators who at the moment enjoy enormous litigational
advantages over individual property owners, and fiercely resist any prospects of losing them. But regulators' extreme
litigational advantages aside, a complex society must get on
with its daily business. One essential facet of that business
is that there must be a discernible level of security and stability in property rights, and a modicum of predictability in
litigation.' ° When people cannot ascertain what they can and
cannot do with their own property in an economically rational manner, without first spending years or even decades
of ruinous but utterly uncertain, deliberately obfuscatory and
usually unsuccessful litigation,'' that is but another way of
saying that they cannot tell what they own, and hence that
they may actually own nothing of value. After all, the U.S.
Supreme Court told us that "property" is only that economic
advantage that the law will protect. 7 ' But when the courts
169. "[A] review of the constitution of the courts in the many states will satisfy us that they cannot be trusted with the execution of Federal laws." Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 836 (1966) (quoting James Madison).
170. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-99 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 570-71 (1905);
Chicago B. & Q. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).

171. We offer as a bloodcurdling example the saga of Thomas and Doris
Dodd, who in 1983 bought a 40-acre parcel of forest land, intending to build
their retirement home on it, only to be told by the Hood River County, Oregon,
land-use regulators that no construction would be permitted because the proposed house would not be "an accessory" use to forest uses-this plainly confiscatory ruling resulted in the following reported decision, Dodd v. Hood River
County, 855 P.2d 608 (Or. 1993); see also 836 P.2d 1373 (Or. 1992) (same case),
59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 1995) (same case), and No. 97-35124, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2011, at *1 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 13, 1998) (same case).

Another, even more grotesque saga is found in the decisions of Corn v.
Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 1996), 997 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir.
1993), 904 F.2d 585 (11th Cir. 1990), 816 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1987), 794 F.
Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1992), and 771 F. Supp. 1557 (S.D. Fla. 1991). And these

were just the federal cases. See also City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Corn, 427 So.
2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), 415 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1982); and 371 So. 2d
1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). In the end, Herman Corn was told that even
though he had vested rights under Florida law, they would not be enforced.
172. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945).
The clear implication of Willow River is that without a dependable rule of law
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will not reliably protect property rights, it is up to the legislature to enact laws that will do so. Unless this is done, the result is certain to produce injustice, inefficiency, eventually
violence,173 and in the end justified erosion of public respect
for the law and for the courts.
The takings legislation presently pending before Congress may not be a finely tuned precision tool, but it is designed to draw a badly needed bright line of some sort in the
now chaotic law. If government regulators think otherwise,
then it is civically and morally incumbent upon them as responsible public officials, to tell the country how the pending
legislation should be amended or redrafted in a constructive,
balanced manner. But to the extent they remain silent on
that point and fault all earnest attempts at a badly needed
rectification of the prevailing intellectual mess, their arguments are not entitled to serious consideration in a society
that values fair treatment of its citizens, and subscribes to
precepts enshrined in the Fifth Amendment and the Eighth
Commandment, respectively. 7 4

there are no property rights. Which is exactly what some regulators and their
ideological allies are about when they advance a legal regime in which de facto
there are no private property rights, except to the extent the government
chooses to create them ad hoc by the issuance of a permit or license, and even
that further subject to the vagaries of the vested rights doctrine.
173. Though thus far that has not been the case, an embryonic protest
movement is rising in the western United States, particularly in rural areas,
that openly views the American government as the enemy of the people. Perceived disregard of the people's property rights is a major factor driving this
movement. See WAYNE HAGE, STORM OVER RANGELENDS (1990). As one of the

local leaders put it to a Los Angeles Times reporter: "In the West, we don't
have $400,000 in a retirement fund or savings account, but we do have 40 acres
of land. The problem is that environmentalists, in their zeal to gain control, forgot about our constitutional rights and that, before they take private property
away from us for public use, people deserve compensation." Frank Clifford,
Cow County Tells U.S. to Back Off, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1994, at A3; Louis Sahagun, A Wave of Distrust in the West, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at Al; Timothy
Egan, Angry Westerners Target Federal Employees, DAILY NEWS (Los Angeles),
Apr. 30, 1995, at 1; Philip Brasher, FarmersRebel Over Wetlands Regulation,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at A9; Barry Seigel, A Lone Ranger: U.S. Forest Service Ranger Guy Pence Is a Persistent and PassionateDefender of Public Lands.
Is That Why Someone Bombed His Office and His Home?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26,
1995, (Magazine), at 20.
174. "Thou shalt not steal." Exodus 20:2-17 (King James).

